In this study we examine the incentives for listed family controlled firms in China to establish political connections and their organizational structure as measured by shareholding concentration and composition of board of directors. We hypothesize and find that listed family firms are more likely to establish political connections when the local markets are less developed and the governments are more powerful in allocating economic resources. In particular, firms are more likely to build political connections when local governments suffer from severe budgetary deficits, when they tend to rely on discretionary charges and administrative penalties for raising revenues, and when they have more leeway in granting business subsidies. We also find that controlling shareholders of family firms with political connections tend to concentrate their shareholding and dominate the board of directors so that they can make deals with government officials in secrecy and enjoy the benefits exclusively among themselves.

Friedman et al. (2003) developed a model in which, in equilibrium, controlling shareholders may choose either tunneling or propping depending on the magnitude of an adverse shock and the magnitude of the private benefits of control. In this paper, we employ connected transaction data from China to test the implications of their model. We hypothesize that, when listed companies are financially healthy (in financial distress), their controlling shareholders are more likely to conduct connected transactions to tunnel (prop up) their listed companies and the market reacts unfavorably (favorably) to the announcement of these transactions. Our empirical findings strongly support our hypotheses. Our analysis supports Friedman et al.’s (2003) model by furnishing clear evidence that it is possible that propping and tunneling might occur in the same company but at different times.

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本文拟对沪深两市36家上市公司季报公布前后股票收益率变动情况进行研究。基于FFJR在1969年的文献中所提及的事件研究方法。发现每天的异常收益率在事件窗口中表现比较平稳，而每天累积的异常收益则具有明显的趋势，投资者在季报公布前后能获得显著的异常收益。反映出我国资本市场尚未达到半强有效，文章在最后指出一国应加强资本市场独立性的建设，有利于增强资本市场对宏观经济周期的超前预示作用。

次贷危机下股票价格变动的分布是否偏离了正态分布。本文从股票价格变动的随机游走理论入手，通过频数分布和序列相关检验验证了金融危机之下股票价格变动的分布，发现股票价格变动序列不具有明显的惯性，分布所具有的正态特征也不十分显著。文章最后指出我国股市的停板制度影响了我国股市的有效性水平。

本文主要是论述了资金的运动在市场变化中起到的作用，以及在图形上的反映。市场上各类指导操作的书籍和文章很多，但是良莠不齐，什么样的都有。这篇文章里的东西都是我本人和通过与一些老手的交流之后总结的实战技巧，透过图形现象看里面的本质，然后再从本质反映到图形的表面。

资本充足率要求是指银行必须保持与其资产相关的最低资本金水平的法律要求。银行法中对于银行无论何时都一样的资本充足要求的问题在于，它太过于关注防范单个银行发生违约这一狭隘目标上，而很少关注银行为了符合监管要求而采取的低价抛售和信用紧缩这些应对监管的行动所产生的外部性问题，而正是这些问题，把单个银行的问题扩散到整个系统，引发社会性的成本。

资本充足率要求是指银行必须保持与其资产相关的最低资本金水平的法律要求。银行法中对于银行无论何时都一样的资本充足要求的问题在于，它太过于关注防范单个银行发生违约这一狭隘目标上，而很少关注银行为了符合监管要求而采取的低价抛售和信用紧缩这些应对监管的行动所产生的外部性问题，而正是这些问题，把单个银行的问题扩散到整个系统，引发社会性的成本。

本文概述笔者在投资者行为和股票价格行为的研究上取得的研究成果。在这些研究成果的基础上，论文对与组合理论紧密相关的4个关键问题：如何计算股票的预期收益率、股票的预期收益率与股票实际实现的收益率的关系、股票预期收益率的方差能否准确地度量股票的风险、均值/方差原则能否科学地描述和度量股票实际实现的收益率和风险之间的关系，进行分析。 分析结论表明：均值—方差原则无法科学地描述和度量股票实际实现的收益率与风险之间的关系；在实际应用中，投资者如果按照均值—方差原则构造和挑选最优股票组合，结果只能是被误导。

小组及其小组长可以归结为制度组织形式，这个组织形式之所以能够形成的缘起在于自组织系统外提供的一个外生局限条件，局限所确立的目标是组织动力的源泉，组织内自然形成的这个制度形式把动力放大并且保证目标的完成。如果自组织内有任何解决不了的巨大困难，自组织的大领导者会求助于外生组织协助问题的解决。