Based on detailed trade records of individual investors who participated in both China’s A- and B- share markets, we find investors are more likely to buy A (B) shares when the A-share premium is lower (higher), when they have already held the same firm’s A (B) shares and when they have previously traded the same firm’s A (B) shares. Given that the correlation between the same firm’s A and B shares is below 70% and that A shares are more expensive, it is sensible for investors to invest more into the B shares. Our evidence suggests that investors accept a less than optimal portfolio due to lack of investment experience.

货币的边际效用递减理论源自于著名数学家Daniel Bernoulli（1738）为解决“圣彼得堡悖论”而提出的效用函数解决方案。然而，王文辉在《圣彼得堡悖论新解与不确定性估值》中证明了Bernoulli的效用函数解决方案是不成立的，因此，货币的边际效用递减是颇值得怀疑的。本文对传统效用理论进行了更深入的分析和阐述，得到了一个效用函数族，并且首次提出了“效用阈限漂移”现象。进而通过理论和实验两方面证明了货币的边际效用并非是单调递减的，而且效用函数与人们的风险偏好没有任何关系，从而纠正了微观金融经济学基础理论中长期存在的误区，为新的研究开辟了方向。

本文根据1996-2009年宏观经济季度数据，运用基于VAR的广义脉冲反应函数方法构建了我国货币状况指数，并考察其是否可以作为我国货币政策的信息指示器。研究表明：（1）货币状况指数对评价我国货币政策执行效果、分析影响货币政策立场松紧的主要因素具有重要参考价值，可以作为我国的货币政策指示器，以增强货币政策执行的准确性，同时我国货币政策的执行，在货币供给量渠道之外，还应重视利率和汇率传导渠道的影响；（2）货币状况指数能够提供我国货币政策最终目标未来变化的动态信息，可以作为我国货币政策目标的先行信息指标，以提高货币政策操作的前瞻性。

集邮界对什么是影响邮票回报最重要的因素一直存在重大争议，即是“发行量为王”，是“消耗为王”，还是“题材为王”？ 这三者都是影响邮票存世量或需求的重要因素，因而会对邮票的回报产生显著影响。到底哪种因素更为重要？大家众说纷纭，一直也没有系统的量化分析来验证。本文通过对新中国邮票的发行后年均回报率及其影响因素进行了全面系统的分析，研究表明总体上新中国邮票为集邮者提供了不菲的收益，显著超出同时期的一年定期存款回报。在决定新中国邮票年均超额回报的因素中，消耗最为重要；发行量是显著影响邮票回报的因素之一，但其经济意义较弱，且对编年邮票回报影响并不显著；传统题材对早期邮票回报影响微弱，但近年发生的重大事件题材对邮票回报影响巨大；此外，邮票的设计印刷对回报也有一定影响。本文的证据支持“消耗为王”的观点。

摘 要：股票市场和债券市场变量之间的溢出效应是近来金融学研究的一个重要课题。本文实证研究了我国股票市场和债券市场流动性之间的溢出效应，提供了关于我国股票和债券市场流动性一体化的证据。研究发现：首先，我国股票市场和债券市场流动性之间存在显著领先滞后关系并互为因果关系，符合“flight to liquidity”；其次，宏观环境的变化对两个市场的流动性会产生显著的影响；更为重要的是，宏观环境对市场流动性的影响很大程度上是通过另一市场的传导而间接的发生作用。

This study examines the effects of different dimensions of financing constraints (financial market development, governance environments, ownership control and other firm-specific characteristics) on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for all takeover bids announced in nine East Asian economies from 1998 to 2005. The results of logistic regressions verify that the extent of stock market and governance developments encourages cross-border M&As in this region. The results also indicate that firm-specific financing constraints, except the ownership control variables, reduce the occurrence of cross-border M&As related to domestic M&As. Although family- and state-controlled firms have better access to external financing, they are reluctant to risk diluting their management control and thus prefers less cross-border M&As to domestic M&As. This study enhances the empirical studies of the financing constraint-investment relation based on the market imperfection theory in corporate finance theories. Information asymmetry is the main reason causing the market imperfection and leading to financing constraints to corporate investments. This study, by examining the relation over nine East Asian firms, thus provides an understanding of how such a relation fits in the firms in countries where information asymmetry is high.

本文借鉴Wugler(2000)提出的回归系数法测算了中国上市公司在2001-2007年期间微观层面的资本配置效率，并研究了2004-2005年期间的金融自由化改革措施对上市公司资本配置效率的影响。结果显示改革后上市公司的总体资本配置效率在短期内并没有立即提高，而是出现了暂时下降。进一步分行业研究表明，制造业资本配置效率的下降尤其显著。本文研究表明中国的金融自由化改革对上市公司资本配置效率的影响可能存在“长期往上但短期往下”的“J”效应。

We examine the effects of government ownership on the change in valuation and the uses of proceeds of firms after they raise equity funds – the time when the agency problems of free cash flows are larger. We find that investors generally react more negatively to an equity offering decision by a company whose government ownership is higher. Firms generally increase cash dividend payments after offering equity, and firms with extremely high government ownership increase cash dividends more than other firms do. Further analysis shows that investors react more negatively to an offering decision if they expect the issuer to increase cash dividends post-offering. Our study suggests agency problems exist in equity offerings in China, and firms tunnel resources by offering shares to the public followed by an increase in cash dividends.

Using the data of privately-owned firms in China’s transition economy, we examine the effects of soft budget constraint on the expropriation of minority shareholders. We find that, compared to small firms, large firms have higher bank loans and are more likely to get government subsidies. However, large firms show higher divergence between cash flow and control rights, more fund occupation by controlling shareholders, and lower market valuation. Moreover these differences between large and small firms become particularly pronounced when the firms operate in the provinces with poorer fiscal conditions. These findings suggest that soft budget constraint can mitigate the expropriation costs of controlling shareholders, and subsequently deteriorates the expropriation of minority shareholders.

家族企业治理是世界范围内讨论的问题，对中国这个家族文化传统最为悠久和深厚的国 度而言，研究家族企业有着特殊的理论与实践意义。本文就中外学术界对于家族企业治 理的研究进行了系统的总结和整理，对2003 年至2006 年我国家族企业上市公司的公司 治理结构和融资方式进行了统计学和个案实证研究，在研究中我们发现：家族企业上市 公司董事长总经理两职状态与资产负债率、长期负债率呈负相关；家族上市公司的股权 集中程度与负债融资负相关；家族企业在股权比较集中的情况下更倾向于股权融资，而 在股权比较分散的情况下更倾向于负债融资。