当前中国经济外需紧缩、出口受阻的现实使汇率变动的贸易效应再次成为理论界和政策界关注的热点问题。基于1981-2006年SITC标准分类的产业数据，本文运用协整与误差修正模型对人民币汇率变化影响出口贸易结构的分析结果表明：人民币汇率变化对出口额的影响无论是长期还是短期都是显著的，且人民币汇率波动对出口分类影响存在较大差别。最后提出了进一步加快出口企业产业转型、促进内需，实现我国产业结构优化升级的对策建议。

前人在研究汇率波动对我国进出口的影响时均采用的是线性模型。然而，在不同的汇率波动幅度下，汇率的价格传递是不对称的，那么汇率对贸易收支的影响可能是非线性的。基于此，本文提出了四个假设，并利用门限面板模型对其进行了验证。结论如下：（1）汇率波动对我国出口的影响存在着门限效应。（2）汇率波动对我国进口的影响存在着门限效应。（3）汇率波动对我国贸易收支净额的影响存在着门限效应。不同的波动幅度下，进出口汇率弹性的绝对值之和是不同的。（4）汇率波动对Marshall-Lerner条件是否成立的影响不存在门限效应，进出口汇率弹性的绝对值之和始终小于1。对于本文的结论，我们还进行了解释。

Business groups organized by pyramids enable the ultimate shareholders to control a portfolio of firms with less cash requirement. Further, corporate pyramid induces an internal capital market and makes capital transfer more convenient within the pyramid. In China, the state and business groups control a large number of listed firms through pyramidal ownership structure. What role does the corporate pyramid play in firms’ investment decisions? What is its influence on firm performance? This paper investigates the capital investment and firm performance from the perspective of pyramidal ownership structure. We find that as the layers of corporate pyramid increases, the capital overinvestment declines. The negative relations between pyramid and overinvestment exist for both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), which indicate that increasing the layers within corporate pyramid reduces the likelihood of overinvestment of the listing firm and improving investment efficiency. Moreover, we show that the effects of increasing the layers of corporate pyramid on accounting performance are different for SOEs and NSOES. For SOEs, increasing the layers of pyramid results in less government interference on the listed firm and more flexibility in operate. Therefore, increasing pyramidal layers is positively related to accounting performance. While for NSOEs, pyramiding is to build an internal capital market for the ultimate shareholder’s capital investment. Although pyramid may reduce overinvestment of the listing firm, agency costs may offset the positive effect and induce a lower accounting performance.

Like other major countries in the world, Chinese listed firms have recently experienced a dramatic rise in executive compensation. However, the arguments that could explain the same phenomena in developed countries can not be extended to the case in China. First, most Chinese listed firms are controlled by the state, thus management cannot set their own compensations through captured boards as suggested by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). Second, very few listed firms in China granted stock options and/or common stocks as part of executive compensations prior to 2005. There is little possibility that executives increased their own compensations by offering stock-option plans implied by Bolton et al. (2006). Based on the facts that the legal investor protection has been improved in China, we argue theoretically and empirically in this paper that the rise in executive compensation of Chinese listed firms can be attributed to the enhancement of legal investor protection. Since the management has to give up part of their private benefit with the improvement of legal investor protection, some private benefits extracted by management before have to be paid in an explicit way in order to make management incentive compatible. This finding partially leads to the increasing trend in executive compensations. It therefore provides a new perspective to explain why executive compensations keep rising in this emerging market where legal investor protection has been improving.

本文在重复道德风险环境下讨论经历的最优薪酬结构问题。我们发现最优薪酬合同呈现出凸性，股票期权和限制性股票则能实现这种最优合同，同时还发现股票期权种类关于博弈期数递增。比较静态分析表明，股票期权和限制性股票的最优授予量关于代理成本和经理的保留效用递增，关于经理的绝对风险规避程度递减，而公司规模队股票期权和限制性股票最优授予量的影响不确定。

基金家族偏爱是基金管理公司与股东之间的一种代理成本。我国基金管理公司独特的治理结构，相较于其它发达国家的基金家族，更容易导致家族偏爱问题的出现。本文以2003年至2007年我国所有股票型开放式基金为样本，从基金费率、历史业绩和基金年龄三个方面考虑，对我国开放式基金家族偏爱进行了实证检验。实证结果表明，在费率与历史业绩的价值区分标准下，开放式基金家族会积极地执行家族偏爱策略。

本文选取2001－2008年我国上市公司作为样本，全面考察了高管货币薪酬与股票收益率之间的隐性关系和可能的显性关系，并估计了高管货币薪酬和用股东财富增长衡量的公司业绩之间的敏感性关系。虽然从制度背景来看，上市公司高管的货币薪酬主要决定于会计业绩指标，但实证研究表明薪酬机制仍然使得高管和股东利益更趋一致，而且有证据表明股票收益率独立地影响货币薪酬；从薪酬业绩敏感性来看，研究发现，虽然高管薪酬存在独立于业绩的增长，但流通股股东财富增加1000元，或者全体股东财富增加9000元，高管薪酬能够平均多增长近10元。解决这种低敏感性的途径自然在于加强股权激励的作用。

2009年11月26日，中国银监会公布了《商业银行投资保险司股权试点管理办法》（下称《办法》）。《办法》分为五章二十六条，对试点机构的市场准入、风险控制和监督管理等三方面做出了规定。从银监会有关负责人就《办法》出台的目的答记者问来看，主要是为了推进商业银行投资保险公司股权试点工作顺利开展，促进银保深层次合作，进一步提高服务水平，提升银行业综合实力与国际竞争力；就商业银行投资保险公司是否会给金融消费者带来好处，当局持有非常乐观的态度。按照当局的看法，《办法》的内容可概括为公司治理、关联交易、并表管理以及业务合作等四个层面，但是，若仔细研读《办法》中的条款，可以明晰地看出，此《办法》蕴涵着另外一更深层的特点，即：金融反垄断理念。

我国自八年前加入世界贸易组织以来，证券期货市场持续繁荣，市场参与主体持续增加，现货市场与期货市场联系日益紧密，资本市场基础制度建设亟待与时俱进。有鉴于此，中国证券监督管理委员会2009年10月13日就《关于修改<证券登记结算管理办法>第十四条和第十九条的决定征求意见稿》公开征求意见，改革我国证券登记结算管理制度的序幕正式拉开。

本文从产品市场竞争的角度检验融资约束如何影响公司价值。在使用两种不同的融资约束划分标准后，本文发现无论在统计意义上还是经济意义上融资约束对公司产品市场竞争产生了重大负面影响。本文也为不同融资约束下资本结构对产品市场竞争行为的差异提供了证据，没有融资约束的公司利用负债增强了其在产品市场竞争中的地位。在宏观经济方面，本文检验了不同融资约束下资本结构与产品市场竞争关系对外部融资环境变化的反应，发现当外部融资环境变化时没有融资约束的公司对外部融资环境敏感性更高。