本文从外部制度环境和内部资本配置两个角度，对创业企业代理成本影响因素展开实证研究。研究结果表明，资本自由化指数与创业企业代理成本之间呈现显著负向关系。表明区域的资本自由化程度越低，创业企业将出现更大的代理成本。并且其中由降低政府干预程度构成的资本自由化因素作用最为明显。研究还发现，创业企业的内部资本配置与代理成本有着显著的关系，具体表现为：（1）拥有国家资本的创业企业代理成本显著高于拥有个人资本或外商资本的创业企业，并且外商资本比例或个人资本比例越高，代理成本越低；（2）对短期负债率的提高能有效降低以营业费用率为表征的代理成本，但却提高了以管理费用率为代表的代理成本，显示现阶段，我国债权人治理效应仍然存在一定的局限性。本文的研究为未来金融改革方向、创业环境政策制定及国有创业企业产权多元化提供了一定的理论依据。

论文以中国深沪两市A 股上市公司2001-2005 年跨越多个年度的大样本数据为基础， 实证分析了股权集中背景下大股东持股及其他公司治理机制对公司价值的影响。结果表明， 大股东持股比例对公司价值的影响具有区间特征，两者间呈现出一种“N”型的三次曲线关 系。且发现在股权集中背景下，公司价值与大股东的国有性质、大股东控制权与所有权的分 离度、独立董事比例、高管持股比例负相关，而与股权结构的制衡水平正相关。表明在中国 股权结构高度集中和对中小投资者的法律保护不完善的背景下，合理安排股权和控制权结构 就显得非常重要。

Using a sample of listed subsidiaries and their parent companies in China, I study top executive compensation and turnover and their relationship to firm performance in business groups in China. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (CEO turnover) in a listed firm is positively (negatively) related to the accounting performance of its parent company. Using related party transactions to proxy for the correlation between the two firms, I find that management compensation in a listed firm is related to the performance of its parent company if related party transactions exist between them. In addition, I find a stronger relationship between the compensation (turnover) in a listed subsidiary and the performance of its parent company when the percentage of common directors and managers are less than median level. This result indicates that the incentive system can be used to align the interests of managers in the listed firm with that of its parent company when the information asymmetry is high and the parent company can not effectively monitor. Using brand name as a proxy for reputation, I find that management compensation and CEO turnover in group firms are more likely to be sensitive to the performance measures in their parent companies if both use the same brand name.

This study proposes an incentive alignment hypothesis of corporate spin-off activities, in which executive compensation contracts tie the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders and the reduction of agency problems enhances firm value through corporate spin-offs. Consistent with this hypothesis, CEOs with a high level of equitybased compensation are more likely to initiate a spin-off. The announcements of such corporate restructurings are reacted positively by the market. Firms engaging in spin-offs provide greater operating growth in the years following the restructurings compared with their size- and industry-matched control firms. Also consistent with this hypothesis, high incentive CEOs yield more personal gains by selling shares and exercising options following spin-offs.

Lin, Cai, and Li (1998) argue that under information asymmetry, SOE managers can use state-imposed policy burdens as excuses of poor performance and make the State accountable for it. The argument implies that turnover-performance sensitivity of SOEs decreases as policy burdens increase and that such impact depends on the extent of information asymmetry. Accordingly, this paper empirically explores how policy burdens affect top management turnover of Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2005. We find that high surplus labor significantly reduces the sensitivity of chairman turnover to performance for state-controlled firms, while private firms do not exhibit such a pattern. Furthermore, our results show that high surplus labor reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity more for firms with greater information asymmetry. Overall, we find strong evidence supporting the implications of Lin, Cai, and Li (1998). In addition, we find that chairman turnover of Chinese firms is sensitive to different performance measures for state-controlled firms and private firms.

We study financial market contracts and signals in a transitional economy where state-controlled banks may lend to weak firms to avert unemployment and social instability. Our sample of Chinese corporate borrowers reveals that that poorer financial performance and higher managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan, and bank loan approval predicts poor subsequent borrower performance. Furthermore, negative event-study responses are observed at bank loan announcements, particularly if the borrower measures poorly on quality and creditworthiness. Our results document the dilemmas that arise in a state-led financial system and the local stock market’s sophistication in interpreting news.

本文从外汇市场经济主体异质性预期的假设出发，运用行为经济学中的前 景理论和学习认知原理，对市场经济主体基于风险调整后的利润不断重新选择其汇率 预测方式及外汇资产选择行为对短期汇率波动的影响过程进行研究，并且考虑到我国 特殊的制度背景，本文强调了央行外汇市场干预在汇率形成过程所起的作用，从而构 建了一个具有明确微观基础、更加符合现实的人民币汇率决定的微观经济主体行为模 型。利用该模型，本文较好地拟合了2007 年10 月至2008 年9 月期间人民币名义汇率 的走势。

人民币汇率变动对我国经济的影响成为当前汇率调整所关注的首要问题。本文在理论分析的基础之上，通过构建汇率波动对经济增长影响的动态模型，采用1978-2006 年样本序列数据，运用向量自回归模型（VAR）、脉冲响应函数（IRF），实证检验了人民币汇率波动对经济增长的影响，实证结果表明：在较短时期内，汇率波动对经济增长产生同向的冲击作用，但长期对经济增长没有太大的影响。在此基础上，本文就促进经济增长应采用的汇率政策提出了简要的对策建议。

中国经历汇率制度改革后，外部经济失衡业已成为政府部门和外汇管理当局的“棘手”问题。在此背景下，本文选取2000 年1 月~2008 年2 月的时间序列数据检验外汇储备累积带来的宏观经济和金融波动影响，借助ARCH 模型和TVP 模型进行动态分析，得出以下结论：外汇储备在长期内影响价格波动，而对产出的影响具有短期性；对经济增长的动态波动系数为-0.09，外部失衡下经济高增长波动较小；反而低速增长时期的波动加大；而对国内宏观金融的影响则恰好相反（分别为0.08和0.689）；TVP 模型检验认为国内产出增加和FDI 流入都上是国际收支波动的主要影响因素，而进口和外汇储备占款成为国际收支失衡量的重要影响因素。最后综合分析认为，借助汇率、利率、物价水平进行国际收支调节和外汇储备调整是当前解决“内外”经济平衡的关键。

本文利用2005 年7 月-2008 年6 月的月度数据，在计算我国各HS 大类汇率指数的基础上，采用面板数据考察了我国各行业的进出口价格的汇率传递效应，并分析了人民币汇率变动对各行业贸易条件的直接影响。本文发现：1）各行业面临的汇率环境有较大差异。2）汇率传递不完全普遍存在，不同行业的汇率传递效应各不相同。3）随着人民币加速升值，各行业的贸易条件分化加剧。但是，人民币汇率变动不是导致我国贸易条件恶化的主要原因。