We study corporate philanthropy using an original database that includes firm-level data on cash giving, political connection, and institutional environment in corporate contribution after Sichuan Earthquake at 12, May, 2008. Results provide support for the theory that political connection enhances corporate philanthropy, as firms with political connection tend to adopt giving practices to generate insurance-like protection of relational wealth; meanwhile firms that condition high levels of law enforcement environment and low risks of loss political connection give less to charity. However, much of our evidence indicates that mangers adopt corporate philanthropy to maintain personal political connection with governments which mask their personal benefits from philanthropic contribution and philanthropy insurance-like protection theory combined with agency costs play a prominent role in explaining corporate giving. Firms with political connection, larger boards of directors and higher interest conflicts among controlling shareholders and other investors are associated with significantly more cash giving. The empirical work considers the impact of institutional environment as well as risks of loss political connection on corporate giving and the relationship between political connection and corporate social responsibility.

已有文献的研究表明，政府干预和企业所有权性质是影响我国企业贷款数量和贷 款期限的重要因素，但都没有考虑这两个因素对企业贷款方式的影响差异。本文以我国2001 －2005 年所有上市公司的经验数据为研究对象，实证分析债权人保护在不同所有制和政府 干预程度下，企业获得的信用贷款差异。研究结果发现，我国国有上市公司确实获得了较非 国有上市公司更多的信用贷款；债权人权利保护得越好，企业能获得更多的信用贷款；但国 有上市公司与非国有上市公司在获得银行长期信用贷款方面并没有显著差异；而且在政府干 预严重的地区，即使是国有上市公司，伴随债权人权利受到的法律保护改善，企业也较难获 得更多的信用贷款。

本文采用GMM（广义距估计）方法对中国沪深两市2001-2006年所有非金融类上市公司的CEO权力对资本结构的影响进行了考察，进而对此期间233个发生财务危机公司和相应经营正常公司的CEO权力对公司资本结构的影响开展比较研究。结果表明，CEO权力大小与公司资本结构呈负相关关系，即CEO权力是影响公司资本结构选择的因素之一。通过对财务危机公司和经营正常公司CEO权力对资本结构影响差异的考察，发现CEO适当集权有助于财务危机公司负债比率的下降。因此本文认为不能否定CEO适度集权，应当选择约束与激励相结合的策略。

本文从股权结构角度研究第一大股东持股比例、第一大股东性质、股权制衡对 投资的影响，以投资现金流敏感度为切入点，将股权结构变量纳入投资模型进行研究，通过 实证研究得出在第一大股东控股的情况下上市公司投资对现金流敏感的原因是投资过度，在 具有股权制衡结构的公司中，其他股东持股比例能起到监督作用。

We examine whether the gains from incentive realignment have driven corporations out of the public security market. It is shown that going private transactions are due to the reduction in the diversification gains from the public market. The anticipated gains from incentive realignment are likely to be lowest among firms whose managers own most equity and the leverages are high. Avoiding the high cost of being public is the primary consideration for managers to take a firm private. Such firms go private because of financial distress and dwindling profitability. These kinds of going-private activities are counter-cyclical. On the other hand, a less distressed firm with diffused ownership has high anticipated incentive gains. The gain from incentive realignment is the dominant factor for these going-private transactions. Such firms go private because of an increase in profitability or an improvement in financial distress. We show that these going-private activities are pro-cyclical.

Standard principal-agent theory predicts that the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) decreases in the risk of the firm. An alternative literature argues that entrenched executives as in weakly governed firms use compensation contract to extract the rent, which renders risk irrelevant in determining PPS. This paper uses event study approach to test both principal-agent model and CEO power theory by studying changes in executives’ compensation contract around litigation events. Consistent with principalagent model prediction, we find that, after the initiation of litigation, PPS drops, compensation shifts from performance-sensitive component (equity) to performanceinvariant component (cash). In addition, all the changes reverse themselves after litigation settlements. To test CEO power theory, we further partition the event firms into firms with good and bad corporate governance. We find that the PPS in firms with bad corporate governance increases after lawsuit and decreases after the settlement. This suggests that litigation brings the bad compensation practice of poorly governed firms to the limelight and forces firms to discipline their CEOs temporarily during the litigation period (so called “limelight effect”), which lends indirect support to CEO power theory. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests including two endogeneity tests.

大家谁也没有见过鬼，在这个前提下画鬼，只要大体上具备几个特征——恐怖、丑陋、怪异，还颇有几分像人（有五官、四肢），画出来的就是鬼。新古典金融理论就像画鬼。新古典金融模型争相勾画（但并不存在）的鬼就是在有效市场的假定下与资产的基本价值相等的资产价格。 金融市场是高度不确定的，金融市场上的不确定性或不确定性因素有多种，这诸多不确定性意味着金融市场几乎是最不具备条件构造模型（尤其是数学模型）的，但新古典金融理论没有条件创造条件，它几乎排除了所有不确定性才建立起画鬼式的新古典资产定价模型：用“市场纪律”（被动接受价格）排除了交易者定价的不确定性；用理性行为假定排除了行为模式的不确定性；用均值回避了目标值的不确定性；用“代表性主体行为分析”排除了主体角色的不确定性；用相同的信念和共同知识排除了主体认知程度甚至认知内容上的不确定性。 金融市场的不确定性可以分为两类，一类是来自主体认知、预期、角色的内在不确定性，一类是来自外部的消息等外在不确定性。比较而言，内在不确定性是根本的，它每时每刻都在影响金融市场，如股票价格时刻都在变动。新古典金融理论通过上述假定几乎釜底抽薪式地规避掉了内在不确定性，规避掉金融市场的内在不确定性后再把金融市场作为不确定性市场来分析，这就是新古典金融理论的荒谬之处。它的某些模型如CAPM，在理性预期、有效市场等强假定下，已经将不确定性市场变成了确定性市场。 新古典金融理论的根本问题在于没有勇气面对真正的不确定性，准确地说，新古典金融理论在做它们根本没有可能做好的事情：对金融资产定价给出精确的模型。

本文针对人民币和韩圆分别考察了不完全关闭NDF、关闭NDF、不完全开放NDF和开放NDF背景下SPOT、DF和NDF市场之间的互动关系和信息流动特征，对不同开放背景下货币当局的政策效果和影响进行了实证研究。DCC-GARCH的研究结果表明：开放NDF市场会促进SPOT、DF和NDF三个市场之间的一体化程度，但同时也意味着波动的相关性大大提高，且NDF市场通常为波动来源，同时会在一定程度上降低央行干预的有效性。在DF市场尚不发达的情况下关闭NDF市场，可能会有利于DF市场的发展，减少NDF在汇率定价中的影响力。

本文对人民币DF和NDF市场上不同期限的美元/人民币远期汇率定价偏差中所蕴含的信息在理论上和实证上进行了多角度的分解和研究，发现样本期内的远期汇率定价偏差是结构突变的非平稳序列，美元/人民币远期外汇市场上的利率平价并不成立，其定价偏差在本质上是市场预期的央行升贬值幅度与美元资产预期收益率的差异，决定远期汇率升贴水的不再是利率平价，而主要是预期和外汇风险溢酬。本文的另一个重要发现是美元/人民币外汇市场上的预期形成机制主要体现为推定预期，而且样本期内NDF定价偏差的变化对近期美元/人民币即期汇率变动具有一定的预测能力。同时，我们的研究还表明，对于国际投资者而言，人民币的风险溢酬和系统性风险为正,而美元的系统性风险则是负的。

本文将股权分置改革本身看做是上市公司拥有的永久性美式看涨期权多头, 并 运用期权分析框架, 分析了股权分置改革时机的选择问题、流通股股东与非流通股股东的博 弈、预期与价格跳跃过程, 找到了该期权定价公司和提前执行该美式期权的最优执行边界, 消 除了在股权分置改革过程中出现的一些认识上的误区, 并对中国的股权分置改革问题提出了 一些政策性建议。