用风险是我国商业银行运营过程中的主要风险，因此加强信用风险的有效评估 至关重要。本文借鉴多传感器信息融合综合评价的优势，建立了基于BP神经网络、支持向量 机和DS证据理论基础上的信用风险评估模型。通过采用国内某商业银行的数据，利用本模 型,BP网络和支持向量机三者做了相应的验证，研究结果表明，该模型相对传统的BP网络和 支持向量机的评估模型，能得出较优的评估结果。本文的研究结论对于丰富我国商业银行的 信用风险评估体系和加强风险管理具有重要意义。

本文研究了我国大额支付系统中银行间支付流与银行间同业拆借利率之间的关 系。实证结果表明大额支付系统中银行间支付流的变化水平对银行间同业拆借利率的条件均 值和条件方差都有显著的影响。随着法定存款准备金率的不断调高，银行间支付流与银行间 同业拆借利率之间的相关关系逐渐增强。

合理的银行利差有利于商业银行创新业务的发展和效率的提升，本文从多维视角 度量了银行利差，拓宽了传统意义_L银行存贷利差的含义，考虑了中间业务影响的会计利差和 反映市场势力的勒纳指数的边际利差，并对中国商业银行1998一2006年的利差进行了实证分 析。结果表明，我国银行利差基本处于一个适中且偏高的水平，并呈现上升态势，这不利于商 业银行业务结构的调整。对影响银行利差的主要因素分析表明，银行的风险管理对银行利差 影响不显著，国有银行机会成本与银行利差存在显著的正相关关系，宏观经济变量对银行利差 有一定的影响，中间业务和银行利差之间不具有因果关系。

本文参照Weymark(1997)等提出的外汇市场压力的概念和理论框架，建立了一个 由三个市场和货币当局构成的中国开放经济宏观模型，利用1994年1月至2008年3月的月度 宏观经济数据，估计了模型的有关参数，计算了这一期间人民币对美元的外汇市场压力指数和 人民银行对外汇市场的干预指数。发现1994年以来，除了东亚金融危机时期的个别月份，人 民币对美元都面临升值压力。1994年汇率并轨后，在汇率的决定中，市场机制一度发挥过一 定作用，但政府干预程度越来越重，亚洲金融危机之后至2005年汇改以前，干预指数接近于1。2005年7月新一轮汇改之后，汇率决定的市场化程度显著提高。

The impacts of business environmental factors on operations strategy choices in a manufacturing context have been heavily researched. However, how managers of service firms in developing countries such as China develop operations strategy has yet to receive any significant attention among researchers. Drawing on the manufacturing literature, we examine, in the Chinese context, the relationships between business environmental factors (such as business cost, competitive hostility, labour availability, and environmental dynamism) and operations strategy choices (such as low cost, quality, flexibility and delivery performance). Employing a path analytic framework, we have identified strong linkages between business environment (viz.: business cost, competitive hostility and environmental dynamism) and operations strategy choices. We have found that environmental dynamism (such as changes in retail technology and innovations in new service development) had the strongest influence on the degree of emphasis placed on operations strategy choices. However, environmental concerns about labour availability do not appear to have any direct effect on the operations strategy selections among retail firms in China.

The Article first presents a brief history or survey of some of the earlier problems that associate with China’s banking and financial institutions. The Article then addresses specific problems, in the context of the rules, procedures, and practices of the banking and finance sector, which widely range from non-performing loans, to China’s money market and interbank lending business. These problems also directly associate with the liberalization of the banking and finance sector of the economy, and the requirements of both the WTO rules and China’s WTO Protocol on accession. The Article also briefly explores the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and its contagion effect throughout the world, including the Asian region. In the context of China and the subprime crisis, the Article summarizes some of the problems that associate with China banking and financial institutions, by focusing on the policy implications of the history of banking and finance in China, and what this means in terms of both WTO compliance and greater liberalization of banking and financial institutions, especially pursuant to the WTO GATS, as service industries. All of this, eventually, allows for the presentation of certain conclusions concerning China banking and finance in the new era of a global subprime crisis.

Comprehensive data on corporate announcements of Chinese firms allows us to examine the preference for, and determinants of, cash and stock dividends. The results indicate that Chinese public investors prefer stock dividends over cash dividends, which are preferred by large state and legal person shareholders generally. Stock dividends, which do not require an explicit cash outflow from a firm, are found to be positively related to higher earnings, supporting the signalling hypothesis of dividend policy. In an imperfect market, these results have some implications for government regulation of financial markets.

During the reform era, the Chinese government has been carrying out strategic industrial policies modelled on those in post-war Japan and South Korea, in the hope of transforming its highly fragmented manufacturing sector into one that comprises a small number of internationally competitive big businesses. Using the evolution of the Chinese steel industry structure from the late 1980s to the early 2000s as a case in point, this paper finds that the Chinese government's consolidation attempts have, by and large, not been very successful. The disappointing policy outcome is interpreted by a detailed examination of the industry policy mechanism in China. It is concluded that the institutional framework of the Chinese state differs from its counterparts in Korea and Japan in some fundamental aspects. Among these, the fragmented and uncoordinated Chinese bureaucracy contributes significantly to the inefficacy of policy implementation.

In China, regional disparities are important. We examine the difference in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow between firms in inland regions and those in coastal regions. By using the financial data of Chinese listed firms, we found that firms in inland regions rely more on their internal funds in terms of their investment activities than those in coastal regions and that the sensitivity gap between inland and coastal firms widened in the recent contractionary monetary policy period. This suggests that firms in inland regions are harder to obtain outside funds due to unfavorable social and economic environments for inland firms. Our findings suggest that capital markets in China respond rationally to the potential impact of regional disparities on a firm’s performance.

This article tests several predictions of tournament theory on executive compensation in the context of a transition economy. Using an unbalanced panel which consists of a total of 34701 executives in 450 publicly listed firms in China during 1999 and 2006, we find that (1) pay increases as executives move up the corporate hierarchy into higher ranks; (2) pay gap is the largest between the first and second tier executives, although it does not increase monotonically across all executive ranks; and (3) pay dispersion increases with the number of tournament participants and the level of noise in the business environment. In addition, we find evidence that state ownership of shares reduces executive compensation and pay gap, and corporate governance structure affect pay dispersion. Overall, our study shows that listed firms in China, as they become more and more market-oriented, have adopted a pay structure that is largely consistent with the predictions of tournament theory, and that it is important to consider both ownership structure and corporate governance in analyzing executive compensation structure.