本文对Kopecky-VanHoose (2004a)理论模型进行简化的基础上分析了资本充足率 约束对银行信贷资产配置影响的微观机制。利用1998-2007 年期间中国14 家商业银行数据 所作的经验研究发现：（1）1998-2007 早期中国银行业面临的资本约束为“软资本约束”， 但资本监管压力对银行资产组合配置的影响在逐渐增强，2003 年银监会成立后，“硬资本约 束”开始显现。（2）资本充足率约束引起的银行“惜贷”和“主动信贷”行为是解释2004-2007 期间我国银行信贷波动的重要原因。（3）国有银行和股份制银行对资本约束的信贷行为反应 敏感性和强度存在显著差异，股份制银行的市场化行为更明显，自2003 年以来其信贷扩张 行为更加谨慎。

文章系统回顾了小额信贷与经济发展的相关研究文献,结合我国有关统计数 据，采用回归模型和协整分析方法，重点就农村金融发展与农村减贫效应进行了 深入研究。文章认为，提高农村金融发展水平有助降低农村贫困程度。在此基础 上，文章联系我国小额信贷业务开展实际，就相关问题提出了政策建议。

论文以中国深沪主板和中小企业板上市公司2004-2008年的横截面数据为基础，分析讨论了中小企业板的实际市场定位和创业板的推出方式选择问题。经验数据的分析结果表明，与主板上市公司相比，中小企业板上市公司具有规模小、固定资产比例低而流动资产比例高、总负债水平低而流动负债比例高、高成长性、高盈利能力的特点，基本符合中小（科技型）企业的公司特征，中小企业板符合其最初的“准创业板”目标市场定位。在此基础上，论文进一步讨论了创业板的“渐进式”推出方式，并对这种方式的可行性作了深入分析。

支啊摇

Dynamic allocation of control rights between managers and investors affects policy of the dividend and value of enterprise. The paper studied the relevant factors that affect optimal debt ratio and allocation of control right. We suggest that the enterprise decrease the debt ratio with the increase of moral hazard, liquidity risk and investors' absolute risk aversion. With the increase of shareholder's control right, the relationship between shareholder's control right and managers' moral hazard is reversed from positive to negative. The implication of the paper is moderate debt ratio may achieve the tough constraint on the managers' decision.

投资行为是否具有效率直接关系到企业价值是否最大化，西方主流财务理论认为负债 尤其是短期负债能抑制企业的非效率投资行为。本文以2001-2007年的面板数据为基础，对 333家中国制造业上市公司的负债融资影响企业非效率投资行为进行了实证检验，结果表明： 中国制造业上市公司的负债融资并不能抑制企业的非效率投资行为，其原因在于债务的“硬 约束”功能没有发挥，同时还存在着严重的资产期限结构与负债期限结构错搭的风险。

Existing literatures indicate that, in Nontradable Shares Reform, institutional investors collude with nontradable shareholders (controlling shareholders) to help them settle a lower compensation ratio. Classifying institutional investors into mutual funds and non-mutual funds, this paper presents a further research upon whether fund governance helps mitigate collusion. Due to the rigorous entry qualifications, and the worldwide reputation as hostage, a foreign background fund is expected to have better governance quality than a domestic fund. Our empirical evidence shows that, relative to those dominated by domestic funds, mutual funds dominated by foreign background funds are less inclined to collude with nontradable shareholders. Introducing foreign institutional investors into domestic markets is Chinese government’s consistent policy. Our evidence indicates that this policy may be beneficial to the sound development of Chinese stock markets. Meanwhile, we find no sufficient evidence that mutual funds dominated by open-end funds are less inclined to collude with nontradable shareholders, although an open-end fund is expected to have better governance quality than a closed-end fund due to the redemption mechanism. As for the effect of ownership structure, it is found that mutual funds with a lower institutional ownership are less inclined to collude with nontradable shareholders. Fund governance seems to deteriorate as institutional ownership increases. Providing an implication for policy making, our evidence suggests that restricting the proportion of fund shares held by institutions may help improve fund governance in China.

根据IPO价格异常 理论，在IPO过程中承销商与审计事务所均发挥着“鉴证”功能，而风险企业IPO过程中最为显著的特点便是其股东包括风险投资家这一特殊的金融中介组织。由于风险投资不仅仅是简单的资金投入，在投资过程中风险投资家还往往提供许多“增值服务”，再加上投资过程中独特的契约设计，因此风险投资是投资契约与产权制度的一种创新。那么IPO公司中风险投资家股东的列席对于公司IPO上市，具体的说对于风险企业IPO定价与IPO价格异常是否有影响？如果有，有何影响呢？其是否也存在着类似于承销商与审计事务所那样的“鉴证”功能呢？

近年来，为发展新农村建设，政府开始着手现代农村金融体系的改革，村镇银行就这样孕育而生。本篇论文是本人对2008年7月在湖南湘乡的实践活动调研成果的个人分析总结。目前湘乡农村金融供求并不对称，体系中很多地方亟需改革。在现有情况下，作为改革试验产物的村镇银行的实际定位与目标定位有所偏差，虽有积极一面但却只发挥了有限的作用。针对这种情况，作者经过思考，试图探讨出其理想的定位，并对于商业利益与社会利益的矛盾如何统一这一命题提出个人观点。

This letter applies the endogenous structural break Minimum Lagrange Multiplier unit root test to re-examine the stationarity of Chinese stock market indices. The main result is consistent with Yan and Felminghan (Applied Economics Letters, 13, 605-608, 2006) who use the ADF-type structural break unit test, and the break we found is more in line with the reality.