The development of the wealth management market is based on the needs of investors. The logic of market regulation should also be based on the interests of investors. On the basis of summarizing the regulatory experience of the global wealth management market, suggestions are put forward to improve the system of China's wealth management market . The fundamental driving force for the establishment of a regulatory legal system for the wealth management market comes from the needs of the development of the wealth management market. Moreover, the structure and process of this institutional construction are also closely related to the structure and development of market demand. China's current wealth management market has become a huge financial sector, and the deepening of the market and the diversification of participants all put forward requirements for the construction of a fair and scientific regulatory system. Wealth management business is different from traditional financial business in many aspects such as function, business standard and business model, and its basic legal relationship is also far from traditional business. The commonality of business in China's current wealth management market is in line with the basic elements of the legal relationship of trust. From the perspective of the realistic basis and the nature of the industry, it is appropriate to define the basic legal nature of wealth management business as a trust relationship. Due to factors such as information asymmetry and economic scale, financial investors are in a serious imbalance and imbalance when they trade with financial institutions. Therefore, the financial supervision system should grasp this core contradiction, give investors the status of consumer protection, and establish the concept of protecting wealth consumers. The regulation of wealth management operators should grasp the requirements of the basic trust relationship, take the basic principle of supervising the performance of trustee duties by financial management institutions, and implement a series of rules for trustees to be loyal and prudent in financial management. These rules should focus on risk prevention, and include establishment of access standards for wealth management business, supervision of independent development of wealth management business, supervision of full performance of prudent management duties by wealth management institutions, and guidance for healthy development of wealth management institutions. The experience in the supervision of developed wealth management markets such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore shows that the establishment of a legal system for the protection of wealth management consumers is an inevitable result of the development of the financial market, and it is necessary to set up special institutions and mechanisms to implement the concept of wealth management investor protection, and emphasize wealth management products. Providers' fiduciary obligations to investors, and functional supervision based on a unified system in the regulatory system can be used as a reference for China . China's wealth management market regulatory system include inconsistent rules, weak protection, biased guidance, and lack of independence. Due to the separate regulatory system, different game rules apply to homogeneous wealth management business operated by different types of financial institutions, resulting in rule conflicts and market injustice. However, the substantive rights of wealth management investors still exist in a vacuum that cannot be confirmed. At the same time, the status of consumers is far from being officially confirmed, and the consumer protection mechanism cannot truly achieve justice. As regulatory guidance still favors the concept and tools of supervising traditional businesses, wealth management institutions mainly expand extensively by selling products, and wealth management products also present serious "bond-like" characteristics. The "non-neutral " positioning of financial regulatory agencies has externalized into phenomena such as rule conflicts, "policy following suit" and "excessive maintenance of stability". Constructing and continuously improving China's wealth management market supervision system is: the purpose of supervision is to restore the effective operation of the market mechanism. The basic legal relationship in China's wealth management market should be recognized as a trust relationship. This is not only an essential requirement of the wealth management market, but also a practical need to integrate regulatory chaos. It is the trend of financial and economic development that the regulatory system positions the position of wealth management consumers. It should start with legislative policies, make key breakthroughs around consumers' substantive rights and protection mechanisms, and gradually improve investor protection mechanisms. The regulatory system should focus on supervising financial institutions to fulfill their fiduciary obligations, and establish sound access rules, business independence rules, prudent management rules, and strict market exit mechanisms. China's wealth management market supervision system should be based on unified legislation and gradually implement functional supervision in order to achieve effective management and harmonious development of the wealth management market.

This paper studies the Level, Slope, and Curve factor model under different tests in the Chinese stock market. Empirical asset pricing tests reveal that the slope factor in the model represents either reversal or momentum effect for the Chinese stocks. Further tests on individual stocks demonstrate that the Level, Slope, and Curve model using effective predictor variables outperforms other common factor models, thus a filter in virtue of multiple hypothesis testing is designed to identify the effective predictor variables. In the filter models, the cross-section anomaly factors perform better than the time-series anomaly factors under different tests, and trading frictions, momentum, and growth categories are potential drivers of Chinese stock returns.

投资者对宏观经济风险的评估如何影响资产价格一直是实证资产定价的难点之一。已有研究指出新闻文本会改变投资者对宏观经济的判断和预期进而影响股价，但如何有效提取与宏观经济风险相关的文本叙事信息来解释或预测资产价格变动，尚未达成共识。本文基于2007-2021年中国七家专业财经媒体的新闻报道数据，首次结合人工智能前沿领域的BERT大语言模型来测度新闻叙事注意力信息，然后利用稀疏工具主成分（Sparse IPCA）估计影响基本面的状态变量和影响资产价格的叙事定价因子。基于A股市场的实证检验发现：第一，本文利用新闻文本估计的状态变量对于消费、产出、国债收益率等宏观经济指标具有显著的预测效果，这表明新闻叙事蕴含着影响经济运行的信息。第二，相比CAPM、三因子等基准模型，基于新闻文本构建的叙事因子模型能更好地解释资产错误定价现象，并对未来资产价格的变化有更强的预测能力。第三，与基于关键词的文本分析方法（如LDA主题模型）相比，利用BERT提取文本信息可在保证因子模型简约性的基础上获得更优异的定价效果。本文的研究结论对于解释资产横截面收益差异有新的启示，同时为应用大语言模型于经济金融学研究抛砖引玉。

This study investigates the relationship between investors’ prior gains or losses and their adoption of extrapolative beliefs. Our findings indicate that investors facing prior losses tend to rely on optimistic extrapolative beliefs, whereas those experiencing prior gains adopt pessimistic extrapolative beliefs. These results support the theory of motivated beliefs. The interaction between the capital gain overhang and extrapolative beliefs results in noteworthy mispricing, yielding monthly returns of approximately 1%. Motivated extrapolative beliefs comove with investors’ survey expectations and trading behavior, and help explain momentum anomalies. Additionally, households are susceptible to this belief distortion. Institutional investors can avoid overpriced stocks associated with motivated (over-)optimistic extrapolative beliefs.

This paper examines the impact of the rating of equity crowdfunding platforms in China on funding campaign success. We gather information from 2014 to 2021 on 583 fund raising campaigns. Our results suggest that campaign success is positively correlated with the reputation of the platforms but especially for the most reputable one. We also show that the level of technological intensity of the industries and services is positively correlated with the amount raised. Overall, our paper suggests that platform ratings provide a valuable signal to investors, especially when projects are risky and when information asymmetry is high.

增值税留抵退税政策是当前经济环境下,政府为减轻企业资金压力、带动扩大有效投资、着力稳定宏观经济大盘而做出的重要举措,因而科学评估留抵退税政策的经济效应对进一步优化税收优惠政策具有重要意义。文章基于 2013—2021 年中国 A 股上市公司微观数据,利用双重差分法评估了 2018 年增值税留抵退税试点政策对企业就业吸纳能力的影响。结果显示,增值税留抵退税政策显著提高了企业的就业规模,该结论在进行动态效应分析、安慰剂检验、排除其他同时期政策影响以及替换模型设定形式四个维度的稳健性检验后依然成立。机制分析表明,留抵退税的就业创造效应主要通过缓解企业流动性约束实现。此外,异质性分析发现,增值税留抵退税政策对融资约束高、劳动密集型、税收征管强度大的企业促进作用更显著。进一步分析表明,留抵退税政策的实施显著提高了企业的技术员工占比和员工工资水平,但对企业劳动收入份额无显著影响。文章结论为政府部门通过留抵退税政策实现“稳增长、稳市场主体、保就业”提供了理论依据和实践参考。

控股股东利益侵占问题是中国证券市场的“顽疾”,近年来证监会采取了一系列监管措施,但仍然收效甚微。文章通过手工收集整理中证中小投资者服务中心行权数据,考察了投服中心行权对上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为的治理效应。研究发现,投服中心的行权有效抑制了上市公司控股股东的利益侵占行为；且这一作用是通过提高中小股东在利益侵占相关议案中的投票率、提高上市公司的媒体负面关注度和增加其面临的诉讼风险实现的。进一步分析发现,上述治理效应在内外部治理环境较差的上市公司中更为显著,且当投服中心采取公开发声和参加股东大会这两种方式行权时,对控股股东利益侵占行为的治理效果更显著。文章拓展了中小投资者保护的相关研究,为投服中心保护中小投资者提供了更加直接的证据,对保护中小投资者和投服中心未来开展工作具有重要借鉴意义。

全国统一大市场建设是新时期中国经济高质量发展的必经之路,而推进这一战略则需打破市场准入管制壁垒。文章利用市场准入负面清单制度试点的准自然实验,以 2013—2018 年 A 股上市公司为对象,考察了市场准入管制放松对企业创新的影响及机制。研究发现,市场准入负面清单制度显著促进了企业创新,而这一效应主要通过“打破地方行政垄断壁垒和强化产品市场竞争激励”的产品竞争机制以及“减少政府要素配置干预和缓解要素市场错配程度”的要素配置机制而实现。进一步分析发现,市场准入负面清单制度引发了企业创新策略的积极调整,具体表现为企业倾向于增加创新投入、提升创新效率以及追求高质量创新,而较高的创新能力能够帮助企业在竞争加剧下取得良好绩效。异质性分析表明,市场准入负面清单制度的创新激励效应主要集中在知识产权保护力度较强的地区、技术密集型企业以及运营效率较低的企业中。文章的研究结果为协调推进市场经济体制改革与创新驱动发展战略提供了理论依据和有益的政策参考。

企业通过跨国并购在全球配置创新资源,并通过协同创新带动技术进步,这成为经济全球化背景下适应科技创新交叉融合模式的重要路径之一。文章构建了创新活动突破企业边界的跨国并购理论模型,并使用双重差分方法实证分析了中国企业跨国并购对协同创新的影响。结果表明,跨国并购促进了企业与其他研发主体之间的协同创新,这种影响主要通过企业内部增加研发投入、外部拓展海外市场和建立战略共享渠道这三个途径得以实现。此外,跨国并购的协同创新效应会受到企业内部特征、外部环境和并购交易行业特征等因素的影响。文章的研究为中国企业通过国际化战略来构建协同创新发展模式,以及双循环新发展格局下借助外循环来提升国内创新能力提供了新的思路。

近年来,美国以国家安全为由大幅加强对华出口管制,滥用实体清单打压中国科技企业,以期遏制中国科技创新发展势头,那么美国能实现其目的吗？鉴于此,文章整理了美国出口管制工具中的实体清单数据和商业管制清单数据,以 2013—2021 年中国 A 股制造业上市公司为研究样本,计量分析了美国对华出口管制对中国企业创新的影响。研究发现：首先,美国对华出口管制对中国企业创新具有双重作用。一方面,其抑制了中国企业创新产出,但该抑制效应会随时间逐渐减弱；另一方面,其促进了中国企业创新投入,该促进效应不仅会即刻显现且具有持续性,在考虑“树大招风”和产业关联的情况下,上述效应仍成立。其次,机制分析表明,美国对华出口管制通过阻碍创新知识流动抑制中国企业创新产出,通过提升企业创新动力促进中国企业增加创新投入。最后,拓展分析显示,美国对华出口管制会促使中国企业转向“内生创新”和减少低质量创新产出,研发国际化、龙头企业带头创新、政府创新驱动都可以帮助企业应对美国对华出口管制。文章的研究既拓展了出口管制对企业创新的研究边界,对探索中国特色自主创新之路也有一定启示。