China has become the world’s largest trading nation and a key destination for exports from informal economies. Conventional trade theory assumes formalization is required for internationalization, based on rules-based markets. This paper challenges that assumption by examining how China’s state-mediated institutional architecture reshapes trade costs for informal exporters. We introduce the liability of informality—disadvantages from misalignment between firm organization and destination institutions—and show that its impact depends on institutional compatibility. Using bilateral trade data (2000–2020), we find that rules-based markets, such as the United States, uniformly penalize informality, reducing trade by ~70%, especially in manufacturing. China exhibits heterogeneous, relationship-dependent outcomes: some informal exporters gain access through strategic alignment, Belt and Road participation, and resource complementarity, though with uncertainty and accommodation-trap risks. Selective formalization combined with relational access captures most trade gains efficiently, highlighting China’s alternative development pathway.
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