We use Hong Kong stock market data for 1982-2001 to test the persistence of the size and value premia and the robustness of the Fama-French (FF) three-factor model in explaining the variation in stock returns. We document a statistically significant and persistent size effect or size premium that is robust even for non-January months but is heightened in January. We also find that the reversal of the size effect in January reported by Chui and Wei (1998) is unique to their study period, while the general reversal of the size effect reported by Lam (2002) may be due to a sample dominated by firms with low to medium book equity-to-market ratios. The book to market effect or value premium is weaker than the size effect and less consistent than in Fama and French (1993) and Drew and Veeraraghavan (2003). Our results also support the explanation that the size and value premia are rewards for risk bearing consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. We further find a large improvement in explanatory power provided by the French and Fama model relative to the CAPM but that the FF model is mis-specified for the Hong Kong market.

Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchanges that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using panel data analysis. The results suggest that the Chinese cross-listings exhibit bonding premium only in U.S. markets, while those non-cross-listed Chinese firms demonstrate better firm performance than those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the results reveal that for all the cross-listed Chinese firms, profitability rate and the leverage ratio play a positive role in improving the firms’ performance. The adoptions of Big Four auditing firms and international accounting standard as a must-to-do corporate governance mechanism regulated by the host stock exchange has less effects on firm’s performance. The study suggests that merely borrowing a corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance of a firm, and therefore to its firm performance; rather, a firm’s own background and country effects also matter.

Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchange that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using cross sectional data. The empirical tests show a mixed result. The cross-listings in New York and NASDAQ (dual-listing is excluded) exhibit bonding premium, while those noncross- listed Chinese firms demonstrated better firm performance that those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the study shed some lights on the relative importance of various corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing the firm performance in the context of the dominance of state-owned-enterprises in the market. The results reveal that different market has different corporate governance mechanisms under its different macro-environments. For the overall Chinese listings, the second largest shareholder of a firm could play a role as an effective corporate governance mechanism in increasing the firm’s performance. A negative relationship between the size of the board and the corporate governance was found. For those cross-listed Chinese firms, by adopting the stringent financial disclosure and the famous auditing firms could increase the firm performance, but not good enough comparing to these non-cross-listed Chinese firms. Meanwhile, controlling shareholder has negative effect on firm performance for the cross-listed Chinese firms. The study suggests that merely borrowing corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance (further to its firm performance), rather, firm’s own background and country effects also matter.

This paper studies trading and prices of dual/cross-listed stocks (i.e., equities from a single company that trade in more than one country). We focus on PRC rms with shares listed in Shanghai and Hong Kong. well-publicized index tracks the average price disparity across the two exchanges and shows signicant variation over time. We show that dierences in order imbalances (in Shanghai vs Hong Kong) explain contemporaneous changes in relative prices at daily and weekly frequencies. Our results help clarify liquidity-driven explanations from sentiment-based ones.