This paper examines how China allocates its newly accumulated foreign assets by analyzing the long-run relationship between net national savings, foreign exchange reserves, and outward direct investment (ODI). Using quarterly data from 2005 to 2023, a cointegrated vector autoregression framework shows that ODI—particularly through state-owned enterprises— has emerged as an important channel for recycling national savings abroad. Although short-run reserve fluctuations persist, sustained reserve accumulation has become less central to China’s external asset management. This study contributes to the literature by highlighting the institutional role of state ownership in shaping cross-border investment patterns and by identifying ODI as a strategic mechanism for channeling national savings internationally. The findings shed new light on China’s evolving approach to external asset allocation and its broader economic and geopolitical implications.

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in shaping pricing dynamics within China’s nascent infrastructure Real Estate Investment Trust market. Introduced in 2021, China’s REITs have rapidly gained policy and market attention as a tool for financing large-scale infrastructure projects through equity-based securitisation. Unlike mature REIT markets, China’s infrastructure REITs are characterised by a high concentration of institutional ownership dominated by state-owned financial institutions. Using panel data on first 9 REITs from May 2021 to April 2024, we find that institutional ownership significantly boosts the premium to net asset value. This effect operates primarily through two channels: reduced market liquidity and increased idiosyncratic return volatility, likely reflecting institutions’ trading activity and informational advantages. The findings highlight how institutional capital serves as a confidence signal in China’s emerging REITs ecosystem. The study contributes to the global REITs literature by offering insights from an emerging market context and provides policy recommendations to guide China’s REITs market development toward greater transparency, diversity, and long-term resilience.

Against the backdrop of potential irrational trading behaviours in financial markets, this study investigates the V-shaped disposition effect in the selling activities of portfolios managed by securities investment funds in China. Utilising quarterly holdings data (2018–2024) of Chinese securities investment funds, alongside daily turnover rates and closing prices of their fund-heavy stocks listed in China's A-share market, a Fama-MacBeth regression analysis is conducted. The empirical results provide robust evidence of a significant V-shaped disposition effect in these fund investments, primarily driven by speculative trading. Moreover, this effect significantly and positively predicts future stock returns of Chinese A-shares. This study enhances understanding of institutional investors' trading behaviours—particularly mutual funds in China—and their decision-making processes in financial markets.

Using a novel and dynamic measure of fund-level herding that captures the tendency of a fund manager to imitate the trading decisions of the institutional crowd based on a sample of 3490 mutual funds in China for 21 years between 2003 and 2023, we find that funds with higher herding tendencies face significantly elevated delisting risks. Additionally, herding behavior is associated with shorter fund lifespans, smaller asset bases, and higher portfolio manager turnover rates. These results remain robust after employing a battery of methods to address endogeneity concerns. Collectively, our study demonstrates that herding substantially amplifies funds’ running risks.

Assessment in vocational education institutions is frequently organized around performance metrics—graduation rates, employment outcomes, and satisfaction scores—gathered too tardily to avert institutional dysfunction. In increasingly unstable policy situations, these models have become precarious: they quantify collapse more frequently than they avert it. This paper presents fuse logic as an innovative mechanism for risk-responsive governance in technical and vocational education and training (TVET). Utilizing systems control theory and the analogy of circuit breakers, fuse logic is a threshold-sensitive, dynamically activated assessment paradigm designed to disconnect institutional activities prior to complete failure. The research formulates a four-stage model—situational sensing, threshold definition, fuse activation, and adaptive reconfiguration—and implements it in a simulated scenario reflecting Chinese TVET trends. When critical metrics surpass risk thresholds (e.g., dropout rate, employment mismatch), fuse logic triggers systematic program shutdowns, stakeholder consultations, and conditional reintegration procedures.This study's contribution is in redefining evaluation from measurement to protection. It advocates a governance framework that permits temporary disconnection to maintain system integrity. Fuse logic enhances conventional quality assurance frameworks by providing an integrated, failure-tolerant layer of organizational resilience. The report concludes with a discussion on transferability, ethical considerations, and prospective avenues for implementation across varied educational systems.

This study employs a Triple-Difference (Triple-DID) model, utilizing balanced panel data at the district level from Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hangzhou between 2018 and 2024, to critically evaluate the effectiveness of the Multi-School Zoning Policy (MSZP) in suppressing the capitalization of educational resources into housing prices and promoting educational equity. The research explicitly accounts for spatial and institutional heterogeneity as well as household strategic behavior.The results indicate that: (1) MSZP significantly reduced the average housing price premium associated with elite school districts by 15.2%, with the strongest effect observed in Beijing and the weakest in Hangzhou; (2) The policy's effectiveness diminishes as the spatial concentration of high-quality educational resources increases, highlighting persistent structural inequalities; (3) In areas characterized by resource monopolization and strong institutional inertia, the policy's suppressive effect on educational capitalization and its gains in educational equity are both constrained.The findings suggest that MSZP alone cannot fully overcome the "spatial lock-in" effect of high-quality educational resources. Achieving lasting equity requires complementary deeper institutional innovations, such as robust cross-district teacher rotation, transparent resource allocation mechanisms, and adaptive zoning algorithms. This research offers quantitative evidence for optimizing policy and institutional tools in the pursuit of comprehensive urban education reform.

This article examines the rapid growth of Real-World Asset (RWA) tokenisation in Asia, focusing on Hong Kong as an emerging regional hub. It analyses three sectoral case studies in renewable energy, real estate, and financial instruments to illustrate the practical applications, market implications, and regulatory challenges of RWA projects. As of September 2025, the global RWA market reached an estimated value of $30.91 billion and is projected to grow into a trillion-dollar market within the next decade. The article highlights Asia’s proactive regulatory initiatives aimed at developing clear tokenisation standards and promoting the sustainable and responsible growth of the virtual asset sector. Supported by regulatory sandboxes and institutional participation in leading financial centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore, the region has become a focal point of innovation in asset tokenisation. Following the introduction, Section 2 reviews the latest developments in RWA as a fast-emerging area of financial and legal practice. Section 3 presents three case studies, while Section 4 provides practical guidance for asset owners and investors. Section 5 discusses key regulatory models and the overseas expansion of Chinese enterprises through digital assets tokenisation, and Section 6 concludes with implications for regulators, investors, and policymakers.

冯静仪

This paper examines the interactional phenomenon where an institutional complainee initiates a complaint and becomes a co-complainant with their original complainant against a third party that is proposed to have caused grievances to both participants. Institutional complainees initiate their third-party complaints when their complainants repeatedly refuse to affiliate with their attempts to shift responsibility or their proposed solutions. This shift from being the complainee to being a co-complainant is regularly accomplished through practices in which the institutional complainee: 1) produces implicit counter-complaints; 2) partitions complainants and themselves as sharing similar identities; and 3) highlights and upgrades their own grievances. Once complainants affiliate with their complaints, institutional complainees attempt to end the complaint sequences. The interactions end with a sense of solidarity sustained between the participants, even though no satisfying solutions are offered to the original complainants. The findings suggest that institutional actors can make relevant their noninstitutional identities and go against what is expected of them as institutional actors to achieve the institutional task of directing blame away from their institutions. Recorded phone conversations between local residents and various institutional actors during COVID-19 lockdowns in China serve as data for this study.

We empirically examine how institutional investors react to adjustments in environmental policies in China. We observe a seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon: when environmental policies intensify, fund managers do not increase their holdings in high ESG-rated firms as might typically be expected; instead, they significantly divest from these firms. This behavior stems from the fact that, under stringent environmental policies, maintaining a high level of ESG investing leads to financial losses and fund outflows, especially in the short term, which impair fund managers’ compensation and raise career concerns. Further, within the context of environmental policy adjustments, our heterogeneity analysis tries to disentangle the true motivations behind institutional investors' ESG adoptions. We demonstrate that both pro-social preferences and financial incentives play pivotal roles, and that fund managers do not tolerate unlimited financial losses when ESG investing underperform. Our findings reveal the economic impact of environmental policies on institutional investors and shed light on the contentious and complex nature of the ESG concepts.