In recent years, despite China’s sustained expansion of public investment in education, pronounced regional disparities in educational development persist, revealing the practical constraints of the existing fiscal sharing structure in advancing equity objectives. In particular, the mechanism through which the allocation of fiscal responsibilities between central and local governments influences educational equity performance remains insufficiently examined in a systematic and empirical manner. From the perspective of fiscal structure, this study seeks to identify and explicate the evolutionary trajectory of educational fiscal equity in China, as well as its underlying institutional determinants. To this end, the study constructs a fiscal performance evaluation framework comprising seven core indicators. Objective weights are assigned using the entropy method, and the TOPSIS model is subsequently employed to conduct a comparative ranking analysis of national education fiscal performance over the period from 2013 to 2023. The results indicate that educational fiscal equity has exhibited an overall upward trend during the study period; however, its evolution displays clear stage-specific characteristics. In the initial phase, improvements in equity were primarily driven by fiscal expansion, leading to rapid gains. In the subsequent period, progress became increasingly constrained by structural optimization bottlenecks, with fiscal performance gradually stabilizing at a plateau in more recent years. Further analysis reveals that the persistently heavy fiscal burden borne by local governments, coupled with the relatively limited regulatory and equalization capacity of the central government, constitutes a key structural impediment to the sustained improvement of educational equity. By elucidating the internal mechanism through which the allocation of fiscal responsibilities shapes educational equity performance, this study provides both theoretical grounding and quantitative support for deepening fiscal system reform and optimizing policies related to the allocation of educational resources.

Despite strong GDP growth and a favourable demographic profile, India faces an impending jobs crisis. A large share of the workforce remains employed in lowproductivity agriculture, while many new labour market entrants are absorbed into the persistently large informal sector. By contrast, China's rapid ascent was driven by manufacturing-led, export-oriented industrialisation, underpinned by large inflows of foreign direct investment and sustained technology transfer. India's manufacturing base remains modest in contrast. The bulk of well-paid, formal employment continues to be concentrated in the high-skill services sector. This paper contrasts the development trajectories of these two economies and identifies several underutilised jobs-growth levers in India: manufacturing, goods exports, manufacturing-oriented foreign direct investment and innovation. All of these remain underdeveloped, yet together they offer a pathway to more labour-absorbing, durable growth. Leveraging them effectively would be central to achieving India's 'Viksit Bharat 2047' ambition of attaining high-income status. The scale of India's challenge to employ eight to ten million labour-market entrants per year implies that job creation must become an explicit policy priority. This calls for greater trade openness, particularly with Asia and Europe, to integrate India into Asia-centric global supply chains as an alternative to China. Labour market reform is equally critical, making the effective implementation of the new labour codes essential. Strengthening innovation ecosystems and realigning education and skills policies to support industrialisation are also key. Without these structural shifts, India's current pattern of jobless growth risks transforming its demographic dividend into a long-term liability.

Firm characteristics help estimate conditional factor loadings. Larger libraries contain new and overlapping information. We use the cross-sectional distribution of firm characteristics as a ruler to evaluate IPCA loading spaces. With factor counts fixed, expanding from 36 to 153 characteristics can improve in-sample fit while representing momentum and size positions less fully. Reallocating shared exposures changes attribution without changing joint fitted returns. With coefficients fixed, exposure references alter holdings, trading, and subsequent risk at the same characteristic target. Statistical factor models should be evaluated not only by return fit, but also by the exposures they represent and the investment decisions they support.

This paper asks whether a personally experienced bubble crash leaves a lasting imprint on investment style. We study this in China’s stock market, where two technology-growth booms —the 2014–2015 Internet boom and the 2025–2026 AI hardware boom—share a similar narrative but are separated by a decade of generational turnover. Following managers across the mutual funds they run from 2013Q1 to 2026Q1, we compare those who lived through the 2015 crash with otherwise similar managers who entered afterwards. We find that the caution of veteran managers reflects a scar rather than a symptom of ageing. Conditional on age and career length, managers who lived through the 2015 crash hold more value exposure and chase technology stocks less when prices have been rising, and this reluctance deepens with how much the crash hurt them—crash-window tenure, performance shortfalls, redemption pressure—rather than with age. These demand differences reach asset prices as well: stocks held disproportionately by managers without bubble memories carry significantly higher subsequent left-tail risk, whereas crash-experienced ownership stabilises the stock, particularly when ownership is broad. Heterogeneous institutional beliefs rooted in career experience therefore shape not only how managers invest but also the crash risk of the assets they hold.

Can fully agentic artificial intelligence predict equity returns in real time? We build a novel dataset of daily AI-generated attractiveness scores spanning the entire Russell 1000 universe, continuously updated since April 2025. Each trading day, the model freely searches the live internet and produces quantitative scores for every constituent stock before the next market open, eliminating both look-ahead bias and attribution bias. A daily value-weighted portfolio of the 20 highest-ranked stocks earns a Fama-French six-factor alpha of 16.5 basis points per day (41.5% per annum), with an average bid-ask spread of 1.92 basis points. Predictability is sharply asymmetric: the model reliably identifies future outperformers but not future underperformers. The evidence points to stock picking rather than market timing: performance is strongest on down-market days, and the alpha does not come from betting on aggregate market direction. The AI’s reasoning traces help explain this predictability. Alpha is concentrated in traces with richer live-web evidence and stronger analytical structure. In the theme attribution, most active alpha reflects firm selection under an investment lens, not broad theme choice.

Firms frequently overstate digital transformation in public disclosures while committing less in observable investment, a phenomenon known as digital catering. We examine whether digital public financial infrastructure can discipline such symbolic behavior. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design on Chinese A-share listed firms over 2014--2024, we find that exposure to China's e-CNY pilot reduces digital catering by roughly 14% relative to the sample mean. The decline is driven almost entirely by reduced rhetorical digital transformation, while balance-sheet-based digital commitment rises only marginally: the e-CNY pilot is associated with substantially less digital talk, but not with a commensurate increase in digital walk in the short run. The effect operates through lower agency costs and reduced information asymmetry, and follows an amplification--substitution pattern---stronger among digital-sector and accounting-opaque firms, weaker where internal controls and institutional ownership are already strong. The evidence identifies financial-transaction verifiability as a novel source of discipline over corporate cheap talk: CBDC-related infrastructure constrains unsupported symbolic claims without immediately accelerating substantive digital investment.

Against the backdrop of systemic financial risk prevention and the pursuit of a virtuous cycle in the real economy, whether Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) shareholding alleviates maturity mismatch of corporate investment and financing activities is a question of critical importance, not only for the development of individual firms but also for high-quality macroeconomic growth. Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2021, this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of LGFVs shareholding on corporate maturity mismatch. The empirical results indicate that LGFVs shareholding can significantly alleviate corporate maturity mismatch and the finding is still robust across a series of empirical checks. Mechanism analyses show that LGFVs shareholding improves firms’ long-term financing capacity through a resource provision channel and restrains overinvestment through a governance optimization channel, thereby collectively mitigating corporate maturity mismatch. Further analysis indicates that the mitigating effect of LGFVs shareholding is more pronounced in firms with concentrated LGFVs shareholding, firms controlled by non-state-owned capital and firms under higher economic policy uncertainty. Our findings provide valuable theoretical insights for policy design aimed at optimizing corporate financial behavior and curbing corporate financial risks.

Partially convertible economies face a market-design problem: trade integration, cross-border investment, and domestic balance-sheet exposure increase the demand for currency hedging before full financial integration is complete. China adopted a distinctive architecture for this problem by fostering a deliverable offshore Renminbi market (CNH) alongside the segmented onshore market (CNY), rather than relying only on non-deliverable forwards. This creates two venues for closely related claims on the same currency. Spot prices are tightly linked, yet CNY and CNH forwards display a persistent and economically large discrepancy. We study that discrepancy in a joint equilibrium model for spot and forward trading with transaction costs and segmented supply. In the benchmark case with common constant supply and deterministic costs, spot parity implies a forward differential with the wrong sign relative to the data. Random offshore stress, modeled as a jump in trading costs, overturns this benchmark while preserving tight spot parity. The model yields a semi-explicit representation in the CNY/CNH application and a calibration of the observed forward discrepancy in terms of the market-implied likelihood and severity of offshore liquidity stress.

Supply chain standardization significantly promotes cross-regional investment by increasing subsidiaries outside headquarters cities, mainly by reducing transaction and information costs and alleviating “outsider disadvantage.” This effect is stronger for non-state-owned firms, firms with lower financing constraints, and those in highly marketized regions. Our findings show that standardization helps overcomeinstitutional and information barriers, optimizing resource allocation. This study expands supply chain governance literature and offers insights for building a unified national market.

With the development of China's economy, more and more Chinese enterprises are active on the world stage, and cross-border M&A is the most effective and fastest way for enterprises to go abroad and make overseas investments, and it is also an important path for globalization after the enterprises have reached a certain stage of growth. Compared to domestic M&A, cross-border M&A is a more complex economic activity, requiring more factors to be considered and greater risks to be taken, with the slightest misstep often leading to operational difficulties for the acquiring company. It is important to consider whether cross-border M&A can improve business performance, the factors that influence the performance of cross-border M&A, and how to improve the performance of enterprises in cross-border M&A. This study takes 100 cross-border M&A events of Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen during the period of 2017-2020 as a sample, and on the basis of reviewing the research results of cross-border M&A at home and abroad, combined with the characteristics of cross-border M&A of Chinese enterprises, from different perspectives, a number of financial indicators are selected to construct comprehensive performance evaluation indicators using factor analysis, and the preliminary analysis shows that after cross-border M&A, the companies with increased performance The preliminary analysis showed that the number of companies whose performance increased after cross-border M&A increased year by year. The impact of industry relevance and transaction equity on M&A performance is not significant; the ratio ofM&A amount to current assets negatively affects firm performance in the year of M&A. Finally, based on the empirical results, relevant policy recommendations are made to encourage better development of private enterprises and improving cross-border M&A performance.