Investment

  • 详情 Impact of local government debt scale on corporate shift from virtual to real economy
    Understanding the impact of local government debt on economic development has emerged as a focal issue for both academic research and policymakers. This study adopts a financing structure perspective and utilizes panel data from 214 cities and 3,228 A-share listed companies in China (2017–2023) to empirically investigate the impact of local government debt on corporate “shift from virtual to real economy” and its underlying mechanisms. The expansion of local government debt significantly promotes enterprises “shift from virtual to real economy”. The positive impact of local government debt on enterprises” transition from financialization to the real economy is more pronounced among firms in first tier and new first-tier cities, non-state-owned enterprises, and labor-intensive industries. Further analysis indicates that local government debt drives capital reallocation from financial investments to real investments by alleviating corporate financing constraints. This study proposes policy recommendations including optimizing debt fund allocation, further optimizing the financing environment, implementing differentiated regulatory measures. These suggestions provide both a theoretical foundation and practical references for synergistically advancing debt governance and real economy revitalization.
  • 详情 Uneven pathways to excellence: The heterogeneous effects of China's Double World-Class Project on the research productivity of PhDs
    The Excellence Initiatives represent a significant investment in higher education, yet little is known about the causal impact of these programs on doctoral students and future researchers. Using a comprehensive student-level dataset, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to identify how China’s Double World-Class (DWC) Project affects PhD students’ research productivity. Our results indicate that the DWC Project significantly increases both the quantity and the quality of research output among PhD students in supported disciplines, even after controlling for supervisor-related effects. In addition, these impacts vary significantly across institutional tiers and academic fields. Lower-tier universities experience considerable increases in publication volume with slight enhancements in quality, while top-tier institutions show no notable variation in either aspect. Disciplinary patterns also vary: Science and medicine show improvement in both measures, while engineering displays little change overall. These findings demonstrate how excellence initiatives influence human capital development via doctoral training and provide evidence-based recommendations for education policymakers aiming to maximize returns on strategic higher education investments worldwide.
  • 详情 Foreign Institutional Investors and Corporate Labor Investment Efficiency
    This article examines the link between foreign institutional holdings and firms’ efficiency in labor investment in the setting of Chinese markets. We find that foreign institutional investors enhance firms’ labor investment outcomes primarily through mitigating asymmetric information and by strengthening internal governance. Specifically, the influence of foreign institutional investors on a firm’s labor investment efficiency is stronger when the firm faces greater labor adjustment frictions. This effect is more evident when foreign institutional investors are originated from countries or areas with stronger cultural connections to China, stronger governance quality, common law traditions, or stronger bargaining power in the firms’ governance. Our paper contributes to the literature in that it documents the monitoring role of foreign institutional investors from the perspective of firms’ labor investment decisions, and adds to the literature on the drivers of firms’ labor investment choices.
  • 详情 Employee Ownership, Market Feedback, and Corporate Investment
    This study investigates the impact of employee ownership on firms’ investment responsiveness to stock market feedback. Using data from Chinese listed firms, we find that employee ownership significantly enhances the sensitivity of corporate investment to Tobin’s q. This effect is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry, greater labor intensity, weaker corporate governance, and higher financial distress risk. While employee ownership is linked to increased subsequent profitability volatility, it also mitigates financial mismatch and downside operating risk. Our findings also suggest that employee ownership drives a shift in corporate strategy, leading to more aggressive approaches and improved risk preferences. These results highlight the role of employee ownership in mitigating agency problems and enhancing firms’ ability to incorporate market information into investment decisions.
  • 详情 Do Political Connections Reduce Customer Complaints? Evidence from China's Online Complaint Platform
    Research Question/Issue: This study investigates whether and how political connections affect customer complaints in the Chinese market, using a comprehensive dataset from the country’s largest online complaint platform. Research Findings/Insights: Analyzing 22,644 firm-year observations from 2018 to 2023, we find that politically connected firms experience significantly fewer customer complaints. A one-unit increase in political connection strength is associated with a 9% reduction in complaints relative to the sample mean. This effect operates through two primary mechanisms: a reputation-motivation channel and a financial resource channel. The mitigating effect is more pronounced for firms in highly marketized regions, those with higher advertising expenditures, companies facing greater earnings pressure, and those with lower tangible asset ratios. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study contributes to the literature on political connections and corporate governance by demonstrating how political capital translates into tangible consumer experience advantages. It also advances research on the determinants of customer complaints by highlighting the role of internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial political ties. Our findings support the Corporate Reputation and Financial Resource Hypotheses while challenging alternative explanations based on regulatory shielding or managerial complacency. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For corporate leaders, our results underscore the importance of reputation management and quality investment, particularly when political connections are absent. Policymakers should consider strengthening public monitoring institutions to reinforce reputational incentives across markets. Investors may use customer complaints as an indicator of product quality and operational stability in their investment decisions.
  • 详情 Hidden Costs of Government-Guided Funds: Evidence from Executive-Employee Pay Gaps
    While government support programs are often effective at helping firms achieve their objectives, these programs may have unintended consequences. Motivated by this, this study empirically examines the impacts of receiving investments from government-guided funds (GGFs) on executive-employee pay gaps in Chinese public firms. The results from difference-in-differences analyses show that GGFs investments lead to a significantly greater widening of the pay disparities between executives and employees in recipient firms than in other firms after funding is granted. This widening gap is driven by a larger increase in executive compensation relative to employee wages. The mechanism analysis suggests that increased cash holdings associated with receiving GGFs create financial slack that facilitates managerial opportunism, ultimately resulting in greater pay gaps. These findings reveal an unintended consequence of GGFs, highlighting an overlooked agency cost of government financial support programs.
  • 详情 The Effects of CEOs' Awards on Corporate Innovation: The Role of Investor Attraction and Talent Attraction
    This paper examines the relationship between award-winning CEOs and the levels of innovation investment in Chinese-listed companies. The findings indicate that CEOs who have received awards are more likely to foster increased corporate innovation. Additionally, these award-winning CEOs are associated with enhanced long-term operating performance for their firms and reinforce the link between current R&D investments and future operational success. Ultimately, our results suggest that CEO awards can enhance corporate innovation through two primary channels: first, by attracting investors, thereby alleviating financing constraints, and second, by promoting greater engagement from academics and overseas talent in innovation initiatives.
  • 详情 Value Investment and Gambling: An Integrated Asset Pricing Model Based on Q and Salience Theory
    We interpret industry discount rates as proxies for value investment, grounded in Q theory, while capturing gambling preferences through salience theory. Integrating these perspectives, we propose a novel asset pricing model (ST-ICAPM) that unifies value investment and salience factors, evaluating its pricing efficacy across Chinese industries from 2004 to 2023. Empirical results show that investment factors tend to negatively predict future returns, while growth factors command risk premia. However, profitability factors exhibit limited explanatory power. Investor expectations are primarily driven by profit growth, emphasizing the need to enhance profit stability for a value-oriented market. Salience intensity, especially when measured via eigenvector centrality within industry networks, serves as a strong negative predictor of returns, emphasizing the importance of conceptual connections over purely economic linkages in shaping investor behavior. Robust tests confirm that the ST-ICAPM outperforms benchmark models (FF3, CARHART4, FF5, ICAPM, and STCAPM) in terms of pricing power. Our findings emphasize the need to promote value investing and restrain gambling behavior as essential strategies to cultivate a resilient capital market in China.
  • 详情 The Externalities of Foreign Investor Disclosure
    We examine the influence of foreign equity flows on China's unique retail-dominated stock market, identifying a novel channel through which investors’ herding creates significant market externalities. We find that the daily disclosure of foreign investors' positions induces local investors to imitate these trades, resulting in observable short-term price distortions followed by reversals. Our analyses, which include inflow predictability tied to disclosure timing and path analysis decomposition, confirm that the herding effect, largely driven by retail participants, is more impactful than the direct effect based on the informational content of foreign capital. Furthermore, inflated stock prices resulting from the herding behavior cause public firms to overvalue and overinvest, leading to reduced investment efficiencies. These findings highlight potential adverse consequences stemming from specific stock market liberalization designs.
  • 详情 Onsite Oversight: Institutional Site Visits and Stock Return Volatility
    In emerging markets characterized by signiffcant information asymmetry, mitigat-ing firm-level risk is paramount for market stability. While the governance role ofinstitutional investors is known, the impact of their direct, on-the-ground engagementremains underexplored. This study’s objective is to investigate how institutionalinvestor site visits, a crucial hands-on governance mechanism, affect stock returnvolatility. Using a sample of Chinese-listed A-share firms from 2012 to 2022, wefind that frequent site visits significantly reduce firm-level stock return volatility.This risk-reduction effect is more pronounced for firms with greater agency problems,poorer ESG performance, and higher expropriation risk. Our analysis, robust toendogeneity concerns, indicates this effect is driven by improved external oversight.We conclude that direct institutional engagement is a vital channel for reducinginformation asymmetry, enhancing corporate governance, and ultimately promotingmarket stability by lowering investment risk.