Under China’s transition toward high-quality financial development, this study investigates the tail dependence among media sentiment, investor attention, and stock market returns using the M-Clayton Copula. Comparative model fitting tests demonstrate that the M-Clayton Copula outperforms both single Copula models and M-Copula models in characterizing asymmetric negative dependence structures. It is particularly effective in capturing both upper-lower and lower-upper tail dependencies, thereby providing a more comprehensive analysis of their interdependencies. The empirical results reveal three key findings. First, a significant positive tail dependence exists between media sentiment and stock market returns, suggesting that they tend to move together under extreme conditions, with notable asymmetry in the strength of co-movements. Second, media sentiment and investor attention exhibit negative tail dependence, with the lower-upper tail dependence coefficient exceeding its upper-lower counterpart, suggesting higher probability of rising investor attention following media sentiment decline than vice versa. Third, a pronounced negative tail dependence emerges between stock market returns and investor attention, particularly showing strong lower-upper tail correlation, implying substantial likelihood of increased investor attention subsequent to market downturns.

Firms frequently overstate digital transformation in public disclosures while committing less in observable investment, a phenomenon known as digital catering. We examine whether digital public financial infrastructure can discipline such symbolic behavior. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design on Chinese A-share listed firms over 2014--2024, we find that exposure to China's e-CNY pilot reduces digital catering by roughly 14% relative to the sample mean. The decline is driven almost entirely by reduced rhetorical digital transformation, while balance-sheet-based digital commitment rises only marginally: the e-CNY pilot is associated with substantially less digital talk, but not with a commensurate increase in digital walk in the short run. The effect operates through lower agency costs and reduced information asymmetry, and follows an amplification--substitution pattern---stronger among digital-sector and accounting-opaque firms, weaker where internal controls and institutional ownership are already strong. The evidence identifies financial-transaction verifiability as a novel source of discipline over corporate cheap talk: CBDC-related infrastructure constrains unsupported symbolic claims without immediately accelerating substantive digital investment.

This paper develops a delegation-based framework to explain how institutional design shapes pricing incentives under risk. Using China’s 2016 IPO reform—which abolished prefunding requirements and transferred payment obligations from investors to underwriters—as a natural experiment, we show that introducing subscription-payment risk (SPR) renders underwriter’s partial residual claimants with respect to unpaid allocations. Building on Baron’s (1982) delegation model, we argue that the reform amplifies information asymmetry and induces underwriters to adopt more conservative pricing strategies to manage perceived payment risk. Empirically, IPOs exposed to SPR exhibit greater underpricing and lower offer prices, particularly when investor bids reflect stronger valuation pessimism. The effect tends to be less pronounced for reputable underwriters and when foreign institutional investors participate. Overall, the evidence demonstrates how risk redistribution and institutional frictions jointly shape underwriter behavior and pricing efficiency in primary equity markets.

This study examines the role of artificial intelligence (AI) adoption in the market for corporate control using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2021. We construct a novel firm-level AI Index through textual analysis of annual reports and find that AI adoption significantly enhances both the likelihood of becoming an acquisition target and the valuation premiums commanded in M&A transactions. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the AI Index is associated with a significant increase in the probability of being acquired and higher deal premiums measured by price-to-earnings multiples. We identify two channels through which AI adoption creates value recognized by the M&A market: an efficiency channel, whereby AI reduces agency costs and improves profitability, and an innovation channel, evidenced by increased high-quality patent output. The persistence of these effects over time further suggests that AI adoption generates substantive improvements in firm fundamentals rather than serving as a transitory informational signal. Importantly, we document significant heterogeneity across ownership structures: the positive effects of AI adoption are substantially weaker for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) than for non-SOEs. Our findings contribute to the literature on digital transformation and corporate finance by demonstrating that AI adoption serves as a value-relevant firm attribute that shapes outcomes in the market for corporate control.

A central premise of mandatory disclosure regulation is that greater transparency reduces information asymmetry and lowers borrowing costs. We challenge this premise by examining industry-level operational disclosure - a regulatory form that reveals horizontally comparable information across peer firms rather than refining individual firm fundamentals. Exploiting the staggered introduction of mandatory industry-specific disclosure guidelines by Chinese stock exchanges between 2013 and 2019, we find that enhanced industry disclosure significantly widens bond credit spreads by approximately 54 basis points - the opposite of what standard disclosure theory predicts. This counterintuitive effect is more pronounced in non-homogeneous industries, among smaller firms, and for bonds restricted to institutional investors. Mechanism tests confirm two opposing channels: disclosure reduces information asymmetry while simultaneously intensifying product market competition by exposing strategically sensitive operational metrics. Our evidence challenges the one-size-fits-all approach to disclosure regulation and highlights that the competitive implications of disclosed information - not merely its quantity - shape credit risk pricing.

This study investigates the impact of employee ownership on firms’ investment responsiveness to stock market feedback. Using data from Chinese listed firms, we find that employee ownership significantly enhances the sensitivity of corporate investment to Tobin’s q. This effect is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry, greater labor intensity, weaker corporate governance, and higher financial distress risk. While employee ownership is linked to increased subsequent profitability volatility, it also mitigates financial mismatch and downside operating risk. Our findings also suggest that employee ownership drives a shift in corporate strategy, leading to more aggressive approaches and improved risk preferences. These results highlight the role of employee ownership in mitigating agency problems and enhancing firms’ ability to incorporate market information into investment decisions.

We examine whether firms with high organization capital (OC) are more likely to purchase Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance, using a panel of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2021. We document a robust positive association between OC and the propensity to carry D&O insurance. The effect remains statistically and economically significant after controlling for firm characteristics and employing multiple identification strategies to address endogeneity. We propose two economic channels through which OC affects D&O insurance demand, namely, agency and information asymmetry. Consistent with these mechanisms, we find that the positive OC–D&O relationship is significantly stronger in firms with weaker internal governance and those facing opaquer information environments. Additional cross-sectional analyses show that this effect is concentrated in privately-owned firms and in regions with more developed market institutions, suggesting that external pressures accentuate the value of insuring key decision-makers. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and remain stable after using propensity score matching, instrumental variable approaches, and the Heckman two-stage model. Overall, the findings highlight OC as a critical internal driver of corporate insurance decisions. Firms with substantial intangible assets strategically obtain D&O coverage to strengthen governance and reduce information frictions, especially in emerging markets like China where formal investor protections are still evolving.

As China's bond market expands rapidly, the complexity of financial guarantee networks and their implications for credit risk have become critical issues in both academic research and financial practice. Utilizing micro-level data from China's credit bond market spanning 2014 to 2024, this study constructs a multi-layer network incorporating bonds, guarantors, and issuing firms to empirically examine the impact of guarantor network centrality on bond credit spreads. The results reveal a significant U-shaped relationship: moderate centrality reduces spreads by bolstering market confidence, whereas excessive centrality increases them due to heightened systemic risk. Mechanism analyses identify systemic risk and information asymmetry as key mediating channels through which centrality affects credit risk premiums. Heterogeneity tests indicate that this U-shaped pattern is more pronounced among state-owned guarantors, real estate firms, and high-risk clusters within the network. Furthermore, both cross-layer connectivity within the multi-layer structure and regional financial development levels significantly moderate the centrality-spread relationship. These findings offer a structural perspective on credit risk pricing in emerging markets and provide valuable policy insights for credit rating system design, guarantee regulation, and systemic risk prevention. International investors could also leverage these findings to better assess systemic risk in interconnected financial markets across emerging economies.

Traditional information asymmetry theories suggest that greater corporate transparency should reduce investor disagreement. Using Chinese mutual fund holdings, we document the opposite pattern: transparency amplifies disagreement among institutional investors. Mechanism tests show that transparency discourages herding while intensifying private information acquisition among fund managers. The effect is stronger for growth-oriented and high-skill funds, and during periods of elevated market sentiment, and among firms with lower credibility, excessive disclosure frequency, and greater investor attention. Further analysis indicates that this transparency-induced disagreement stems from informed trading rather than noise, thereby enhancing price informativeness and market efficiency. Overall, the evidence reveals the dual nature of transparency as both an informational input and a behavioral catalyst that increases disagreement in financial markets.

In emerging markets characterized by signiffcant information asymmetry, mitigat-ing firm-level risk is paramount for market stability. While the governance role ofinstitutional investors is known, the impact of their direct, on-the-ground engagementremains underexplored. This study’s objective is to investigate how institutionalinvestor site visits, a crucial hands-on governance mechanism, affect stock returnvolatility. Using a sample of Chinese-listed A-share firms from 2012 to 2022, wefind that frequent site visits significantly reduce firm-level stock return volatility.This risk-reduction effect is more pronounced for firms with greater agency problems,poorer ESG performance, and higher expropriation risk. Our analysis, robust toendogeneity concerns, indicates this effect is driven by improved external oversight.We conclude that direct institutional engagement is a vital channel for reducinginformation asymmetry, enhancing corporate governance, and ultimately promotingmarket stability by lowering investment risk.