Taking China Pilot Free Trade Zone (PFTZ) as a new perspective of institutional environment optimization, this paper investigates its impact on corporate ESG performance. We find that the PFTZ positively enhances corporate ESG performance, which remains robust after various checks. The mechanism analysis shows that improving corporate environmental protection capacity and management efficiency are the main channels while strengthening labor protection and easing financial constraints can enhance the positive effect. Moreover, the positive effect of the PFTZ on corporate ESG performance is more pronounced in coastal regions, the service sector, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

We examine the effects of controlling shareholder stock pledge on corporate acquisition decisions and associated performance. Consistent with our aggravated expropriation hypothesis, we find that pledging firms in China initiate more takeovers, but these acquisitions conducted by pledging firms experience lower announcement returns. We adopt the difference in differences and the instrumental variable approaches to establish causality. Channel tests further reveal that pledging acquirers overpay for the deals and are more likely to be involved in related party transactions. Cross-sectionally, we find that the relations between the share pledge and corporate acquisitiveness and returns are more pronounced for non-SOEs and firms with high-level excess cash. Lastly, we document that pledging acquirers underperform in the long-run in terms of lower ROAs and a greater likelihood of goodwill impairment. Overall, our findings indicate that controlling shareholders increasingly expropriate minority shareholders through self-serving corporate takeovers after the stock pledge.

We examine the effects of controlling shareholder stock pledge on corporate acquisition decisions and associated performance. Consistent with our aggravated expropriation hypothesis, we find that pledging firms in China initiate more takeovers, but these acquisitions conducted by pledging firms experience lower announcement returns. We adopt the difference in differences and the instrumental variable approaches to establish causality. Channel tests further reveal that pledging acquirers overpay for the deals and are more likely to be involved in related party transactions. Cross-sectionally, we find that the relations between the share pledge and corporate acquisitiveness and returns are more pronounced for non-SOEs and firms with high-level excess cash. Lastly, we document that pledging acquirers underperform in the long-run in terms of lower ROAs and a greater likelihood of goodwill impairment. Overall, our findings indicate that controlling shareholders increasingly expropriate minority shareholders through self-serving corporate takeovers after the stock pledge.

This study examines the role of regional develop imbalance on China’s mutual funds investment behaviours after controlling for various firm attributes. Consistent with evidence from developed markets, we find that China’s mutual funds prefer large liquid stocks with better governance arrangement, higher visibility, growth perspective and prudent features. More importantly, our results show that macroeconomic conditions of stock locations affect mutual funds investment decisions. In particular, mutual funds overweight stocks from the emerging inland regions in response to the “development campaign of the western regions”, and they are able to pick out the “Western Stars” to obtain superior performance. Further investigation of stocks from the nine coastal regions suggests that there exists an “invest towards the neighbour south” phenomenon within the developed coastal regions. Although mutual funds are rational by investing into their southern neighbours, the reason of this anomaly remains a puzzle for further investigation.

In China, regional disparities are important. We examine the difference in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow between firms in inland regions and those in coastal regions. By using the financial data of Chinese listed firms, we found that firms in inland regions rely more on their internal funds in terms of their investment activities than those in coastal regions and that the sensitivity gap between inland and coastal firms widened in the recent contractionary monetary policy period. This suggests that firms in inland regions are harder to obtain outside funds due to unfavorable social and economic environments for inland firms. Our findings suggest that capital markets in China respond rationally to the potential impact of regional disparities on a firm’s performance.

本文首先将隐含期权的概念引入到现代商业银行利率风险管理之中，明确指出若商业银行的资产负债项目包含有隐含期权，则传统的基于持续期的利率免疫技术将不再适用；并在此基础上，介绍了一种期权基础的定价模型――OAS，在现代商业银行利率风险管理中的应用。