Singapore

  • 详情 Singapore Washing: Shein, Manus, and TikTok
    Against the backdrop of the techno-nationalist “new cold war," Singapore has become the premier “neutral port” for technology and other commercial transactions between China and the West. For example, Singapore is one of the few cities in the world in which both American and Chinese AI companies like Google DeepMind and Alibaba maintain research labs, and it hosts the global headquarters of the world’s most popular video streaming app, TikTok. Besides, thanks to Singapore’s neutral status and its world-leading shipping, legal, logistical, and finance infrastructure, it has benefited from the new “cold war” by acting as a way for Chinese companies like Shein and Manus to circumvent U.S. export controls or investment bans. At the same time, Singapore is also increasingly being used as an end run around China’s own techno-nationalistic export and foreign investment controls on the sale or transfer of data and sensitive technologies. This represents a new twist on the old “Singapore washing” formula, which previously was focused on avoiding Western extraterritorial laws rather than Chinese cross-border regulations. Thus, this article proposes an anlaytical framework to understand "Singapore washing" as an indirect form of inbound and outbound foreign direct investment involving Chinese entities, before identifying other advantages of the Singapore "neutral port" beyond its vaunted neutrality.
  • 详情 Alcohol consumption and the value of community
    his article investigates the value of access to alcohol consumption by examining housing price changes after a liquor ban that was catalyzed by an unexpected riot in Singapore. The ban restricts alcohol consumption in liquor control zones further than in areas outside such zones. We find that the housing price changes in the liquor control zones were weak, which implies that the utility and disutility of alcohol consumption almost cancel each other out. In contrast, housing prices increased for houses within 800 m of but outside the liquor control zones. We investigate potential explanations for these phenomena.
  • 详情 Tokenisation of Real-World Asset (RWA): Emerging Practices, Case Studies, and Regulatory Trends in Asia
    This article examines the rapid growth of Real-World Asset (RWA) tokenisation in Asia, focusing on Hong Kong as an emerging regional hub. It analyses three sectoral case studies in renewable energy, real estate, and financial instruments to illustrate the practical applications, market implications, and regulatory challenges of RWA projects. As of September 2025, the global RWA market reached an estimated value of $30.91 billion and is projected to grow into a trillion-dollar market within the next decade. The article highlights Asia’s proactive regulatory initiatives aimed at developing clear tokenisation standards and promoting the sustainable and responsible growth of the virtual asset sector. Supported by regulatory sandboxes and institutional participation in leading financial centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore, the region has become a focal point of innovation in asset tokenisation. Following the introduction, Section 2 reviews the latest developments in RWA as a fast-emerging area of financial and legal practice. Section 3 presents three case studies, while Section 4 provides practical guidance for asset owners and investors. Section 5 discusses key regulatory models and the overseas expansion of Chinese enterprises through digital assets tokenisation, and Section 6 concludes with implications for regulators, investors, and policymakers.
  • 详情 From Credit Information to Credit Data Regulation: Building an Inclusive Sustainable Financial System in China
    A lack of sufficient information about potential borrowers is a major obstacle to access to financing from the traditional financial sector. In response to the need for better information to prevent fraud, to increase access to finance and to support balanced sustainable development, countries around the world have moved over the past several decades to develop credit information reporting requirements and systems to improve the coverage and quality of credit information. Until recently, such requirements mainly covered only banks. However, with the process of digital transformation in China and around the world, a range of new credit providers have emerged, in the context of financial technology (FinTech, TechFin and BigTech). Application of advanced data and analytics technologies provides major opportunities for both market participants – both traditional and otherwise – as well as for credit information agencies: by utilizing advanced technologies, participants and credit reporting agencies can collect massive amounts of information from various online and other activities (‘Big Data’), which contributes to the analysis of borrowing behavior and improves the accuracy of creditworthiness assessments, thereby enhancing availability of finance and supporting growth and development while also moderating prudential, behavioral and conduct related concerns at the heart of financial regulation. Reflecting international experience, China has over the past three decades developed a regulatory regime for credit information reporting and business. However, even in the context of traditional banking and credit, it has not come without problems. With the rapid growth and development of FinTech, TechFin and BigTech lenders, however, have come both real opportunities to leverage credit information and data but also real challenges around its regulation. For example, due to fragmented sources of borrower information and the involvement of many players of different types, there are difficulties in clarifying the business scope of credit reporting and also serious problems in relation to customer protection. Moreover, inadequate incentives for credit information and data sharing pose a challenge for regulators to promote competition and innovation in the credit market. Drawing upon the experiences of other jurisdictions, including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Singapore and Hong Kong, this paper argues that China should establish a sophisticated licensing regime and setout differentiated requirements for credit reporting agencies in line with the scope and nature of their business, thus addressing potential for regulatory arbitrage. Further, there is a need to formulate specific rules governing the provision of customer information to credit reporting agencies and the resolution of disputes arising from the accuracy and completeness of credit data. An effective information and data sharing scheme should be in place to help lenders make appropriate credit decisions and facilitate access to finance where necessary. The lessons from China’s experience in turn hold key lessons for other jurisdictions as they move from credit information to credit data regulation in their own financial systems.
  • 详情 Institutional Innovation of China's Wealth Market Regulation
    The development of the wealth management market is based on the needs of investors. The logic of market regulation should also be based on the interests of investors. On the basis of summarizing the regulatory experience of the global wealth management market, suggestions are put forward to improve the system of China's wealth management market . The fundamental driving force for the establishment of a regulatory legal system for the wealth management market comes from the needs of the development of the wealth management market. Moreover, the structure and process of this institutional construction are also closely related to the structure and development of market demand. China's current wealth management market has become a huge financial sector, and the deepening of the market and the diversification of participants all put forward requirements for the construction of a fair and scientific regulatory system. Wealth management business is different from traditional financial business in many aspects such as function, business standard and business model, and its basic legal relationship is also far from traditional business. The commonality of business in China's current wealth management market is in line with the basic elements of the legal relationship of trust. From the perspective of the realistic basis and the nature of the industry, it is appropriate to define the basic legal nature of wealth management business as a trust relationship. Due to factors such as information asymmetry and economic scale, financial investors are in a serious imbalance and imbalance when they trade with financial institutions. Therefore, the financial supervision system should grasp this core contradiction, give investors the status of consumer protection, and establish the concept of protecting wealth consumers. The regulation of wealth management operators should grasp the requirements of the basic trust relationship, take the basic principle of supervising the performance of trustee duties by financial management institutions, and implement a series of rules for trustees to be loyal and prudent in financial management. These rules should focus on risk prevention, and include establishment of access standards for wealth management business, supervision of independent development of wealth management business, supervision of full performance of prudent management duties by wealth management institutions, and guidance for healthy development of wealth management institutions. The experience in the supervision of developed wealth management markets such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore shows that the establishment of a legal system for the protection of wealth management consumers is an inevitable result of the development of the financial market, and it is necessary to set up special institutions and mechanisms to implement the concept of wealth management investor protection, and emphasize wealth management products. Providers' fiduciary obligations to investors, and functional supervision based on a unified system in the regulatory system can be used as a reference for China . China's wealth management market regulatory system include inconsistent rules, weak protection, biased guidance, and lack of independence. Due to the separate regulatory system, different game rules apply to homogeneous wealth management business operated by different types of financial institutions, resulting in rule conflicts and market injustice. However, the substantive rights of wealth management investors still exist in a vacuum that cannot be confirmed. At the same time, the status of consumers is far from being officially confirmed, and the consumer protection mechanism cannot truly achieve justice. As regulatory guidance still favors the concept and tools of supervising traditional businesses, wealth management institutions mainly expand extensively by selling products, and wealth management products also present serious "bond-like" characteristics. The "non-neutral " positioning of financial regulatory agencies has externalized into phenomena such as rule conflicts, "policy following suit" and "excessive maintenance of stability". Constructing and continuously improving China's wealth management market supervision system is: the purpose of supervision is to restore the effective operation of the market mechanism. The basic legal relationship in China's wealth management market should be recognized as a trust relationship. This is not only an essential requirement of the wealth management market, but also a practical need to integrate regulatory chaos. It is the trend of financial and economic development that the regulatory system positions the position of wealth management consumers. It should start with legislative policies, make key breakthroughs around consumers' substantive rights and protection mechanisms, and gradually improve investor protection mechanisms. The regulatory system should focus on supervising financial institutions to fulfill their fiduciary obligations, and establish sound access rules, business independence rules, prudent management rules, and strict market exit mechanisms. China's wealth management market supervision system should be based on unified legislation and gradually implement functional supervision in order to achieve effective management and harmonious development of the wealth management market.
  • 详情 Value of Qualification to Buy a House: Evidence from the Housing Purchase Restriction Policy in China
    China’s housing purchase restriction (HPR) policy imposes administrative restrictions on households’ home purchase eligibility to curb speculative demand. We quantify households’ willingness to pay (WTP) to re-acquire such eligibility. The empirical results based on the staggered DID specification suggest that when local governments implement the HPR policy, the transaction prices of judicial housing auctions legally exempted from HPR increase by 18.91%. This HPR-exempted qualification premium can be converted to an estimate of 22.48% of the transaction price as buyers’ WTP for home purchase eligibility. The heterogeneity analysis also suggests that the WTP significantly increases when speculative incentives are stronger in the housing market. If policymakers in mainland China consider replacing the HPR policy with an additional buyer transaction tax like that in Singapore and Hong Kong, China, the WTP estimates can serve as the benchmark in setting the tax rate.
  • 详情 Development Considerations for a Chinese National Securities Market
    This is a contribution to a conference volume for the 2010 National University of Singapore Symposium on ―Law and Development in China - The Legal Dimension of China’s Development Model.‖ The paper aims to shed some light on the way forward for the Chinese securities markets. It examines the desirability of financial markets for broader economic development, and presents the national market system implemented by the US and the norms in the EU’s MiFID that promote competition among and integration of securities markets and alternative trading venues. The paper assesses the current state of the Chinese securities markets, where according to law trading is concentrated on traditional exchanges, against the backdrop of the rapidly evolving (disintegrating) US and EU markets. Clearly, China will be able to learn much from the experiences of the US and EU, but the route that China will take for further evolution of its national market for securities can at this point be neither predicted nor projected.
  • 详情 Volatility Spillovers from the Chinese Stock Market to Economic Neighbours
    This paper examines whether there is evidence of spillovers of volatility from the Chinese stock market to its neighbours and trading partners, including Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and USA. China's increasing integration into the global market may have important consequences for investors in related markets. In order to capture these potential eects, we explore these issues using an Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) return equation. A univariate GARCH model is then adopted to test for the persistence of volatility in stock market returns, as represented by stock market indices. Finally, univariate GARCH, multivariate VARMA-GARCH, and multivariate VARMA-AGARCH models are used to test for constant conditional correlations and volatility spillover eects across these markets. Each model is used to calculate the conditional volatility between both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Chinese markets and several other markets around the Pacic Basin Area, including Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, during four distinct periods, beginning 27 August 1991 and ending 17 November 2010. The empirical results show some evidence of volatility spillovers across these markets in the pre-GFC periods, but there is little evidence of spillover eects from China to related markets during the GFC. This is presumably because the GFC was initially a US phenomenon, before spreading to developed markets around the globe, so that it was not a Chinese phenomenon.
  • 详情 Cross-listing, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance An Empirical Test on Bonding Hypothesis
    Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchanges that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using panel data analysis. The results suggest that the Chinese cross-listings exhibit bonding premium only in U.S. markets, while those non-cross-listed Chinese firms demonstrate better firm performance than those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the results reveal that for all the cross-listed Chinese firms, profitability rate and the leverage ratio play a positive role in improving the firms’ performance. The adoptions of Big Four auditing firms and international accounting standard as a must-to-do corporate governance mechanism regulated by the host stock exchange has less effects on firm’s performance. The study suggests that merely borrowing a corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance of a firm, and therefore to its firm performance; rather, a firm’s own background and country effects also matter.
  • 详情 Cross-listing, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance An Empirical Test on Bonding Hypothesis
    Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchange that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using cross sectional data. The empirical tests show a mixed result. The cross-listings in New York and NASDAQ (dual-listing is excluded) exhibit bonding premium, while those noncross- listed Chinese firms demonstrated better firm performance that those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the study shed some lights on the relative importance of various corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing the firm performance in the context of the dominance of state-owned-enterprises in the market. The results reveal that different market has different corporate governance mechanisms under its different macro-environments. For the overall Chinese listings, the second largest shareholder of a firm could play a role as an effective corporate governance mechanism in increasing the firm’s performance. A negative relationship between the size of the board and the corporate governance was found. For those cross-listed Chinese firms, by adopting the stringent financial disclosure and the famous auditing firms could increase the firm performance, but not good enough comparing to these non-cross-listed Chinese firms. Meanwhile, controlling shareholder has negative effect on firm performance for the cross-listed Chinese firms. The study suggests that merely borrowing corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance (further to its firm performance), rather, firm’s own background and country effects also matter.
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