We study how financial markets integrate news about pollution abatement costs into firm values. Using China’s automation of pollution monitoring, we find that firms with factories in bad-news cities---cities that used to report much lower pollution than the automated reading---see significant declines in stock prices. This is consistent with the view that investors expect firms in high-pollution cities to pay significant adjustment and abatement costs to become “greener.” However, the efficiency with which such information is incorporated into prices varies widely---while the market reaction is quick in the Hong Kong stock market, it is considerably delayed in the mainland ones, resulting in a drift. The equity markets expect most of these abatement costs to be paid by private firms and not by state-owned enterprises, and by brown firms and not by green firms.

A unique natural experiment in China – the city-level staggered introduction of admin-istrative approval centers (AAC) – reduces bank loan processing times by substantially speeding up the process of registering collateral without affecting credit decisions. Fol-lowing the establishment of an AAC, firms significantly reduce their cash holdings. State-owned enterprises are less affected. Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings de-creases, as does the cash flow sensitivity of investment. The share of short-term debt increases, while inventory holdings and reliance on trade credit decrease. Defaults also decrease. These results suggest that timely access to credit has important implications on firms’ financial management.

Do firms adjust their hiring decisions after receiving environmental punishments? Using data on over 4.3 million job postings for Chinese listed firms from 2015 to 2021, we find that firms subjected to environmental punishments will subsequently increase their corporate green hiring (i.e., employees with green skills). Pressure from local environmental concerns and regulatory efforts incentivizes firms to increase their demand for employees with green skills. Environmental punishments have a more pronounced effect on corporate green hiring for non-state-owned enterprises and firms with lower financial constraints. Moreover, green hiring can have a remediation effect on firms' environmental performance and stimulate their green innovation activities and spillover effects on other firms within the industry. Overall, our findings shed light on corporate hiring decisions under environmental regulations.

Does large-scale privatization increase income inequality? To answer this question, we analyze the impact of China’s reform of state-owned enterprises on labor market outcomes in urban areas from 1992 to 2004, exploiting cross-prefecture variation in reform exposure stemming from initial differences in the employment shares of urban collective enterprises and state-owned enterprises. Our analysis reveals that workers in prefectures with higher exposure to the reform experienced a more rapid decline in employment and a slower increase in income, compared to those in less exposed areas. Further analysis shows that individuals with lower income and those with lower educational attainment experienced greater losses. A back-of-the-envelope analysis indicates that the reform contributed to more than 40% of the study period’s increase in income inequality.

The scale expansion of low-carbon industries and the green transformation of carbon-intensive industries are two sides of the same coin in achieving the “dual carbon” goals. However, research on transition finance supporting the upgrading of traditional existing carbon-intensive industries remains insufficient. The key to examining the effectiveness of transition finance lies in distinguishing whether the supported enterprises are engaging in greenwashing or green evolution. Based on data of Chinese A-share listed companies in the carbon-intensive industries, an empirical study is conducted and offers the following findings: (1) Transition finance not only does not increase greenwashing but also promotes comprehensive green innovation in carbon-intensive enterprises. (2) In terms of the influencing mechanism, transition finance exerts “resource effects” and “signaling effects,” promoting green innovation by improving debt maturity mismatch and attracting green institutional investors. (3) Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive impact of transition finance on green innovation is particularly pronounced among enterprises in the eastern region, state-owned enterprises, and those with lower levels of managerial myopia. (4) Further industry spillover effects analysis reveals that transition finance empowers green innovation within industries though peer effects and competitive effects. The findings are essential for understanding the effectiveness of transition finance and offer valuable insights for policymakers.

This study investigates the impact of analysts' information source diversity on forecast bias and investment returns. We combine the GPT-4o model and text similarity, to extract the names of information sources from the text of analyst in-depth reports. Using 349,200 sources, we calculate information diversity scores based on the variety of data sources to measure analysts’ ability of selecting relevant information. The findings reveal that higher information diversity significantly reduces forecast bias and enhances portfolio returns. The effect is particularly pronounced for large companies, state-owned enterprises, those with low analyst coverage, low firm-specific experience, and reports with positive forecast revisions. Institutional investors recognize the value of this skill, while retail investors remain largely unaware, which contributes to financial inequality. This study highlights the critical role of information diversity in analyst performance.

The reform of the IPO registration system is a crucial step toward the maturity, improvement, and marketization of the securities market. In recent years, the trend of corporate financialization has become increasingly evident. Based on data from firms listed on the ChiNext Market and the Main Board, this paper constructs a Propensity Score Matching-Difference-in-Differences (PSM-DID) model and an RDD-DID model to examine the impact of IPO registration system reform on corporate financialization and analyze its underlying mechanisms from multiple perspectives. The estimation results of both models indicate that the IPO registration system reform has significantly increased firms’ financialization levels. Furthermore, a series of robustness checks confirm the reliability of the findings. The mechanism analysis reveals that the reform has promoted corporate financialization by lowering listing thresholds, alleviating financing constraints, and intensifying market competition. Meanwhile, its information disclosure mechanism has to some extent curbed financialization. Further heterogeneity analysis shows that the reform’s promoting effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with lower growth potential, and those with weaker corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. This study enriches the literature on the policy impact of IPO registration system reform, provides a new perspective on how such reforms influence corporate financialization, and offers important implications for curbing excessive financialization in real-sector enterprises, deepening IPO registration system reform, and further improving capital markets.

We examine the effect of minority shareholder voting rights on labor investment efficiency using a sample of Chinese firms. Taking advantage of the difference-in-difference setting, our study reveals that the expansion of minority shareholder voting rights has a detrimental effect on labor investment efficiency. Through analysis of holding period and a managerial shortsightedness index based on textual analysis, we find that this outcome can be attributed to the fact that minority shareholders typically prioritize short-term gains over long-term corporate growth. Moreover, the impact of voting power is more pronounced in determining the investment efficiency of rank-andfileemployees. Our results are more significant for firms that face severe financial constraints, are non-state-owned enterprises, exhibit lower levels of internal control, possess fewer female managers, demonstrate lower human capital quality and higher labor intensity. Taken together, our paper suggests that minority shareholders could be myopia in making labor decisions.

We construct firm-level indicators to capture the engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, henceforth) via textual analysis. We find that higher firm engagement in BRI predicts higher stock returns in the subsequent 12 months. The top 10% high-BRI firms have 12.42% higher annual returns than bottom 10% low-BRI firms in China A-Share market. Additionally, two fundamental channels of increased earnings and reduced liabilities explain the higher expected returns of high-BRI firms. Furthermore, we reveal that the phenomenon is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises. For large-cap firms, BR Report is a more effective indicator for predicting future stock returns, while BR Beta performs better for small-cap firms. These findings contribute to the measurement of firm engagement in BRI and its impact on the stock market.

This study attempts to shed new light on how the state as a minority shareholder can affect the tax planning of non-state-owned enterprises(non-SOEs). We examine publicly traded non-SOEs in China and find that non-SOEs are more tax avoidance when the government is a minority shareholder, indicating that minority state ownership has played a "shelter effect" on tax avoidance of non-SOEs. Further analysis shows that the sheltering effect of minority state ownership is more prominent for firms located in areas with more social burden, worse tax enforcement and firms with stronger incentive to avoid taxes. Furthermore, non-SOEs with minority state ownership increase excessive capital expenditure and employ redundant employees, but still have higher firm value. Overall, our findings suggest the state as a minority shareholder shapes the tax-planning activities of non-SOEs in a “two-way favor exchange” manner and it is beneficial for non-SOEs to maintain a close relationship with the government in China where the government controls key resources.