基于新经济地理学和投资学的交叉视角，大量研究发现风险投资机构倾向于投资其所在地附近的企业。French and Poterba(1991)发现，美国投资者更愿意将资金投资于本国资本市场，而忽略了国外的投资机会，因而将其称为本国偏好之谜Covaland Moskowitz(1999)最早将本国偏好转移到本地偏好（local bias）发现风险投资更乐意投资本地企业或者在距离上离自己办公地址更近的企业；Ivkovic and Weisbenner（2005）、Cumming and Dai（2009）、Brown etal(2011)、Hochberg and Rauh（2013）、李志萍和罗国锋等（2014）等也得出了同样的结论。 国外学者的研究主要围绕独立风险投资的本地偏好成因和经济后果展开国内学者注意到风险投资类型的重要影响作用尤其是本地风险投资机构的本地偏好成因及其经济后果研究，但在我国制度环境下，相比于从本地异地视角，从政府风险投资视角研究本地偏好能够更加深入地揭示本地偏好的成因。现有文献更多地利用信息不对称和心理学理论对本地偏好进行解释，但这并不足以解释政府风险投资机构的本地偏好。因此，本文试图从政府干预风险投资市场的动机出发，依托政府职能理论和官员激励理论解释政府风险投资机构的本 地偏好，以丰富对本地偏好成因的文献解读。 研究结果发现：相较于独立风险投资机构而言，政府风险投资机构的本地偏好程度更高；而且政府绝对控股的风险投资机构本地偏好更强；在市场化进程较高的地区，政府干预程度更低，政府风险投资的本地偏好程度会减弱。本文的创新之处在于：（1）从政府干预风险投资市场的动机出发，利用政府职能理论和官员激励理论对政府风险投资机构的本地偏好成因进行解释并加以实证检验，（2）揭示了政府控股程度对本地偏好的影响。

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the effects of Computer-based Trad-ing (CBT) on Treasury bond expected returns. We document a strong relationship between bond expected returns and the overall intensity at which CBT takes place in the Treasury market. Investing in bonds with the largest beta to the aggregate CBT intensity and shorting those with the smallest generates large and significant returns. Those returns are not due to compensation for facing conventional sources of risk or to transaction costs. Our results are consistent with capital-flow based explanations implied by asset pricing models with institutional investors.

We propose a model of bank monitoring and borrower financial misreporting. Using the staggered liberalization of the banking sector in China as a natural experiment, we find that, consistent with the model’s prediction, entry by more efficient foreign banks reduces corporate misreporting fraud. Fraud reduction is greatest among borrowers of foreign banks, but fraud also drops among borrowers of domestic banks, suggesting a spillover effect. As predicted by the model, fraud reduction is greatest for borrowers with higher levels of fixed assets or lower levels of working capital. Our evidence suggests that improved bank monitoring reduces financial misreporting.

This paper evaluates the impact of mobile cashless payment on credit provision to the underprivileged. Using a representative sample of Alipay users that contained detailed information about their activities in consumption, credit, investment, and digital footprints, I exploit a natural experiment to identify the real effects of cashless payment adoption. In this natural experiment, the staggered placement of Alipay-bundled shared bikes across different Chinese cities brings exogenous variations to the payment flow, allowing me to address the endogeneity issues and establish a causal relationship. I find that the use of in-person payment in a month increases the likelihood of getting access to credit in the same month by 56.3%. Conditional on having credit access, a 1% increase in the in-person payment flow leads to a 0.41% increase in the credit line. Those having higher in-person payment flow also use their credit lines more. Importantly, the positive effect of in-person payment flow on credit provision mainly exists for the less educated and the older, suggesting that cashless payment particularly benefits those who are traditionally underserved.

人类的每一次巨大进步都离不开远行，远行不仅体现了人们对新事物、新环境 的渴望和探索，同时也有助于资源和能力的积累。基于这种直觉，本文手工搜集了上市公司 独立董事的出生地、求学地和工作地信息，探索独立董事的跨地区经历对企业创新的影响。 研究发现，独立董事的跨地区经历越丰富，任职公司的创新投入和产出水平越高。该结论在 考虑独立董事出生地差异、变量测量误差、自选择等内生性问题后依然成立。机制分析结果 发现，跨地区经历丰富的独立董事不倾向于选择相对稳定保守的会计职业，更可能在总部位 于出生地、求学地和工作地以外省份的上市公司任职，所任职公司的股价波动也较高，即跨 地区经历丰富的独立董事风险偏好更大;同时，跨地区经历丰富的独立董事也更可能拥有政 治关联背景、更可能在大规模公司任职、获得的津贴也更高，即跨地区经历丰富的独立董事 资源和能力也更优。更高的风险偏好和更优的资源、能力使得独立董事在公司创新活动中发 挥着重要作用。

儒家伦理反对经济组织通过非正当途径谋求经济利益，有助于保护投资者的正当权益。但是，根植 于儒家的威权主义要求下级组织或个人顺从上级的权威，可能会减轻控股股东掏空上市公司的阻力。本文 从控股股东关联交易的视角出发，对上述竞争性假设进行实证检验，结果表明:(1)儒家影响与控股股东 掏空水平负相关，并通过削弱控股股东威权地位保护中小股东正当权益;(2)儒家伦理与法制存在互补关 系。此后，作者从伦理与威权冲突的视角寻找工具变量进行稳健性检验，获得了相似的结果。本文为客观 认知和评价儒家伦理和威权主义在投资者保护中的作用提供了经验证据。

以往董事会文献大多关注单一董事会特征如何解释公司绩效，缺乏同时考虑多维董事 会特征对公司绩效的预测性研究。本文运用机器学习方法探究 46 个董事会特征对公司绩效的预测 能力，发现:1. 董事会特征可以预测公司绩效;2. 董事平均薪酬、董事会持股比例、董事平均任期、 学历异质性的预测能力较强，董事会结构特征预测能力较弱;3. 公司绩效与董事平均薪酬基本呈正 相关，而与董事会持股比例、董事平均任期、学历异质性呈非线性关系。该结果说明，我国公司 中董事会特征与公司绩效的关系紧密且复杂，运用机器学习方法可以帮助我们认识这些复杂关系、 提升对公司绩效预测的准确性。

Using hand-collected data on siblings of chairpersons in Chinese family firms, we examine the impact of the chairperson having siblings on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of their firm. The findings suggest that when a firm has a siblings-chairperson, the firm has a better CSR rating than firms with a chairperson without siblings. Specifically, a firm with a siblings- chairperson, on average, has a CSR rating approximately 7.96% higher than a median firm’s rating. The conclusions are robust to a battery of robustness checks including a regression discontinuity research design, alternative measures of CSR, a propensity score matching sample, placebo tests, and different estimation methods. Additional analysis suggests that the mechanisms behind siblings and CSR are consistent with both competition and altruistic effects among siblings. Further analysis suggests that the positive impact of a siblings-chairperson on the CSR rating of firms is more salient when the local familism culture is stronger, when government official career advancement incentives are lower, or when the siblings are directors or CEOs of other firms. Finally, firms with a siblings-chairperson are also pro-shareholder because they consume less perquisites than firms without a siblings-chairperson. Collectively, the findings are consistent with the notion that, by having at least one sibling, a chairperson is more competitive and altruistic than a chairperson without siblings, and such behavior enhances CSR. Family structure matters in corporate practices.

现有文献主要聚焦于风投机构本身的静态同质化价值增值职能，围绕风投机构的增值职能与风险投资退出表现展开了大量研究。本文提出风险投资与创业企业之间的匹配结构对风险投资退出表现的影响机制问题。基于Fuetal.(2018b的研究模型，我们通过进一步的理论分析发现：创投双方匹配结构会影响双方各自最优努力水平，造成风投机构价值增值职能的动态异质性，表现出影响风投机构的退出表现；同时采用实证模型研究发现：创投双方的匹配契合度越高越有助于改善风投机构退出表现，创投双方的匹配差异度对风险投资提出表现呈现倒U型关系特征，支撑了理论模型的研究结论。本文为探索风险投资退出表现与创业企业发展成长的决定机制提供了一个崭新的研究视角充实和扩展风险投资对企业成长发挥增值职能的研究基础

Exploring a novel dataset and a unique policy experiment, this paper examines the role of government intervention in the emergence of venture capital (VC) in China during 1999-2013. Using difference-in-difference methodology, I find that the central government program leads to an increase in local investment from both government and private VCs, which doubles the number of successful companies. The positive impact is most pronounced in relatively less developed regions and during the early development of the VC sector. I present two micro-level transmission channels of the crowding-in effects, through networks formed by previous investments and through co-ownership in VC affiliates.