How do private equity (PE) investors affect a firm’s decision-making during the IPO process? The special IPO approval system for China’s stock market provides a unique setting to investigate this issue. In China, all IPO candidates need to submit an application to the China Securities Regulatory Commission and only approved firms can then be listed. Using data from ChiNext, we documented that pre-IPO PE investors, who invested in a firm less than a year prior to the IPO filing day, are associated with higher earnings management at the IPO, while longterm PE investors are associated with lower earnings management at the IPO. We propose that this is because long-term PE investors may prefer conservative financial statements to increase the probability of gaining approval in order to guarantee successful exit; on the other hand, pre- IPO PE investors are more likely to have political connections that can help the firms gain approval and they share the profits through a high IPO price. Consistent with this explanation, we find that local pre-IPO PE investors, who are more likely to have strong political connections, are associated with a higher probability of IPO approval. The evidence suggests that PE investors do have an impact on a firm’s decision-making during the IPO process. It also points to an important cost of the IPO approval system in China as well as the rent-seeking behavior associated with it.

现有的研究大多认为，并购会损害企业长期绩效，并会表现出“先升后降”的特征。然而，本文利用DEA-SFA二次相对效益模型对关联并购绩效的研究结果却表明，关联并购无论对企业短期绩效还是长期绩效均具有明显的提升作用，而并非传统观点所谓的会表现出“先升后降”的特征。事实上，真正“先升后降”的是关联并购对企业绩效的提升程度。本文的研究结论是，现阶段关联并购对上市公司绩效主要是发挥“支持之手”的作用，不过这种提升作用会随着时间推移而逐渐减弱。此外，本文还借助DEA-SFA二次相对效益模型估计了影响因素对关联并购绩效的作用。

本文在剔除由资产规模变动引起的机械效应基础上重新检验了企业的融资行为对资本结构调整速度、均值反转与持久性的影响。实证结果发现：在剔除了这种机械效应后，企业的融资行为仍引致资本结构的均值反转现象，但因调整速度很低而使得均值反转的趋势不是很明显。同样地，在剔除了机械效应后，资本结构的持久性系数不再为正，企业的长期融资行为导致资本结构发生了偏离目标值的过度调整。这意味着Lemmon等（2008）所发现的资本结构持久性现象很可能是资产规模长期变动引起的机械效应所致，而不是企业长期融资行为的结果。总之，在剔除了机械效应的影响后，我们没有发现支持动态权衡理论的足够证据。

近年来，利率市场化、金融脱媒化、金融互联网化趋势已愈演愈烈。与过去相比，传统的银行业经营环境正变得更加动态化、更加难以预测。因此，银行加强自身战略研判能力，对适应银行业竞争形势的发展有着重要意义。本文系统梳理了国有商业银行和股份制银行研究部门的演变历程，并选取了18家城市商业银行作为研究对象，系统分析了我国城市商业银行研究部门的职能定位、人员构成以及组织模式变迁等方面的情况，最终指出了我国城市商业银行研究部门组织模式的发展路径。

本文从投资者非理性的视角研究了投资者情绪对企业过度投资行为的影响，并进 一步考察了哪种类型企业的过度投资行为更易受投资者情绪的影响，而哪种类型企业的过度 投资受投资者情绪的影响程度较轻。基于中国沪深两市上市公司1998-2010 年的样本数据， 实证结果显示在中国市场上投资者情绪对公司过度投资有显著为正的影响；拥有越多自由现 金流量的公司，其过度投资行为受投资者情绪的影响程度越高；而融资约束程度越高的公司， 其过度投资行为受投资者情绪的影响程度越低。上述研究发现拓展了对投资者情绪影响公司 投资行为的经济后果的研究，有助于我们更好地从微观视角理解金融市场的非理性如何影响 企业的资源配置效率，乃至影响到整个实体经济的发展。

The existing literature on political capital and bank lending has largely overlooked the role of political environment. Based on the theories of political marketplace, all-pay auction and political instability, we examine the conditional effect of political capital on access to bank loans with political environment surrounding private firms changing, using a nationwide survey of private firms in 2010. In particularly, we characterize the political environment with political capital inequality and political instability. We find that private firms have more difficulty gaining access to bank lending with the increase in the degree of political capital inequality. Furthermore, political capital exerts a positive effect on access to bank loans only when political capital inequality within a province exceeds 0.4775 and political instability does not exceed 0.7.

本文通过控制项目自然状态来模拟私有信息环境，通过控制投融资双方的角色比例来体现谈判力，以此来研究两者对直接融资市场上中小企业融资契约选择偏好的影响。实验结果表明：（1）私有信息对融资方的契约选择有显著影响，当双方谈判力均等且融资方具有项目好（坏）状态的私有信息时，融资方最倾向于选择标准债务（股权）契约。（2）在控制私有信息的前提下，投资方拥有谈判力将会导致选择可转债的融资方比例增大。（3）在融资方具有私有信息且投资方拥有谈判力的前提下，投资方谈判力越大，则融资方私有信息对自身契约选择的影响越小。以上研究为消除我国中小企业直接融资市场的信息不对称所带来的负面影响提供了理论支持。

近些年“流程银行”建设成为我国商业银行建设热点，但很多银行反映“流程银行”建设效果不佳，原因是其“流程银行”建设走入误区，本文通过“流程银行”一词出处介绍、流程银行基本概念介绍，具体说明了一些“流程银行”建设误区的问题，进而说明“流程银行”建设路径计划和流程，以及“流程银行”建设水平提升的方向和改进措施。

This paper uses a dataset of more than 100,000 firms over the period of 2000-07 to assess whether and why Chinese firms overinvest. We find that corporate investment in China has become increasingly efficient over time, suggesting that overinvestment has been declining. However, within all ownership categories, we find evidence indicating a degree of overinvestment by firms that invest more than the industry median. The free cash flow hypothesis provides a good explanation for China’s overinvestment in the collective and private sectors, whereas in the state sector, overinvestment is attributable to the poor screening and monitoring of enterprises by banks.

高管薪酬始终被认为是解决公司治理框架下第一类代理问题的重要机制之一，不过高管薪酬机制的有效性却始终受到怀疑。管理层权力理论认为，管理层能够利用其掌握的权力对高管薪酬决定机制和调整机制施加影响，从而造成其薪酬与公司业绩之间发生偏离的情况。高管团队与管理层权力密切相关，高管团队的变化既可能是管理层权力作用的直接结果，也会对管理层权力运用产生某种程度的影响。本文发现，高管更迭的比例与董事长兼职数量显著负相关，高管团队规模和高更更迭的比例减弱了独立董事比例对高管薪酬水平的影响，高管更迭质量可以增强独立董事比例以及总经理兼职数量与高管薪酬之间的显著性程度。