• 详情 投资者异质信念下可转换债券赎回策略研究
    可转换债券现有研究模型多建立在投资者理性范式之下,较少考虑投资者异质信念的影响,易造成可转换债券定价偏差,市场上所存在的众多异象如推迟(或者提前)赎回至今也未能获得良好的解释。本文尝试将行为金融理论引入可转换债券定价模型之中,采用投资者的后悔厌恶来表征投资者的异质信念,构建了投资者异质信念下可转换债券定价模型,重点探讨了异质信念对可转换债券赎回策略的影响。理论模型及数值实验结果均表明可转换债券发行者的后悔厌恶情绪是可转换债券推迟(或者提前)赎回的一个重要原因。
  • 详情 Investment Anomalies with Regional Development Imbalance:Evidence from China Mutual Fund Holdings
    This study examines the role of regional develop imbalance on China’s mutual funds investment behaviours after controlling for various firm attributes. Consistent with evidence from developed markets, we find that China’s mutual funds prefer large liquid stocks with better governance arrangement, higher visibility, growth perspective and prudent features. More importantly, our results show that macroeconomic conditions of stock locations affect mutual funds investment decisions. In particular, mutual funds overweight stocks from the emerging inland regions in response to the “development campaign of the western regions”, and they are able to pick out the “Western Stars” to obtain superior performance. Further investigation of stocks from the nine coastal regions suggests that there exists an “invest towards the neighbour south” phenomenon within the developed coastal regions. Although mutual funds are rational by investing into their southern neighbours, the reason of this anomaly remains a puzzle for further investigation.
  • 详情 政策调控、杠杆率与区域房地产价格
    本文运用全国37个大中城市自2005年1季度至2009年4季度的动态面板数据模型和面板误差修正模型,验证了理论模型得出的关于杠杆率与房地产价格的关系。同时,文章将37个城市划分为一线、二线和三线城市给予实证,结果得到房贷政策调控至今效果不佳,及其在三个区域的效果可能不同的主要原因,即杠杆率在房地产价格决定和波动中的影响及表现形式存在不同。并进一步得出结论:房贷政策调控对一线城市的房价影响最深,但是房价的表现并非单边的;对二线城市房价的单边影响最大,提高首付比例和贷款利率都将导致二线城市的房价有所下调;对三线城市的房价影响最小,该区域的房价上涨更多地是由不断升高的土地交易价格驱动。
  • 详情 The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Estate Price Growth in China
    Using quarterly data from 1998:Q1 to 2009:Q4 and monthly data from July 2005 to February 2010, this paper examines the impact of key monetary policy variables, including long-term benchmark bank loan rate, money supply growth, and mortgage credit policy indicator, on the real estate price growth dynamics in China. Empirical results consistently demonstrate that lower interest rate, faster money supply growth and loosening mortgage down payment requirement tend to accelerate the subsequent home price growth, and vice versa. These results suggest that Chinese monetary policy actions are the key driving forces behind the change of real estate price growth in China. We also show that hot money flow does not have significant impact on the change of home price growth after controlling for the money supply growth. Finally, a bullish stock market tends to accelerate subsequent home price growth.
  • 详情 证券分析师预测“变脸”行为研究——基于分析师声誉的博弈模型与实证检验
    在金融市场上,证券分析师的预测行为通常会发生偏差。在股市高涨时,分析师随波逐流,常常发表过度乐观的预测;而当泡沫消退时,分析师则会掉头转向,发布与之前形成强烈反差的盈余预期或股票推荐。对于这种分析师基于市场状态而发布忽高忽低预测的“变脸行为”,传统的理论观点无法做出完整清晰的解释。本文试图将行为金融理论中日渐兴起的迎合理论纳入分析框架,运用声誉博弈分析的方式建立分析师迎合行为模型。该理论模型表明:为了提高自己的声誉以获得更多的利益,分析师会迎合投资者的先验信念而故意发布有偏的信息。本文对中国金融市场上分析师的盈余预测和投票推荐行为展开了实证研究,为声誉博弈模型的理论预期提供了强有力的证据。
  • 详情 市场群体的交易性条件反射及其量化方法
    本文通过我国股市的高频数据和相关性分析来研究市场群体的学习和心理行为。我们根据心理学中的操作性条件反射,首次提出一个交易性条件反射的概念,用成交量-价概率波方程中的成交量概率来计量市场群体交易性条件反射的强度。我们发现:总体来说,平均收益率与交易性条件反射强度变化之间具有显著的正相关性,市场群体对收益率的心理预期显著地表现了卖出的处置效应和买入的羊群行为,并且该“羊群”对价格趋势的心理预期明显地大于其反转的;第二,我们还发现在细分后的某一时期,它们之间具有显著的负相关性。我们用条件反射来解释他们的交易行为。
  • 详情 中美股市泡沫区制转换特征识别:基于状态空间马尔科夫区制转换模型
    本文将状态空间马尔科夫区制转换模型,与向量自回归--对数线性资产定价模型相结合,用于中美股市泡沫区制转换特征的识别和预测。我们发现这一新的计量模型可以成功识别中美股市泡沫的稳定增长和爆炸性膨胀两个区制,估计不同区制之间的转换概率。在此基础上,分析了中国和美国泡沫特征的共性和差异性。我们还做了样本内和样本外预测以进一步验证我们的结论。
  • 详情 反垄断理念应融入金融制度改革
    2011年,我国全面步入“十二五”时期。为深化改革开放、加快经济发展方式的转变,党中央、国务院加大改革创新力度,相关部门竭力从各自法定职责出发,确保未来我国经济可持续科学发展。从经济社会发展的角度来看,宜从金融反垄断的角度进行完善。
  • 详情 金融发展、技术进步与对外贸易产业升级的PVAR分析
    本文利用1990~2008年中国省级面板数据,应用新近发展的PVAR方法,研究了金融发展、技术进步与对外贸易产业升级之间的动态关系。结果发现,金融发展、技术进步与对外贸易产业升级之间存在着非对称的互动关系:金融发展对技术进步和对外贸易产业升级都具有正向的推动作用,但是反过来,技术进步和对外贸易产业升级并没有对金融发展产生正向的推动作用。此外,技术进步与对外贸易产业升级之间存在着良性的正反馈交易机制。因此,三者之间可能存在这样一个作用机制,即金融发展可以通过促进技术进步,进而间接促进对外贸易产业升级。
  • 详情 Public Policy and Venture Capital Market: A Contract Design Approach
    Although asymmetry of information and positive externalities in venture capital provide the justification for government intervention, no one can guarantee that distortion of resource allocation does not exist when government correct market failures. From the point view of incomplete contract theory, government intervention could affect the achievement of contract for the unverified information and actions, leading to inefficiency of venture capital, therefore It is important for us to understand the performance of public policy which is how to improve how to improve the venture capital. To establish the sequential offer game model with moral hazard of entrepreneur, considering with the additional funds provided by the government and certification of quality as well as the spillover effects of venture capital. Under the assumption that the government has the ability to identify high-ability entrepreneur, the introduction of government leading fund and the arrangement of control can induce more specific investment of entrepreneurs. The preceding investment provide investors with additional information, therefore it is optimal. The non-government leading fund supported entrepreneurs will face with worse situation since limited funding and the requirements of capital preservation. Therefore government leading fund should carefully select the investment strategy.