Insurance was one of industries that were opened very first after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. During 2002 to 2005, there was a peak of the foreign insurers’ entry, with the rapid growth of their market share. However, in recent years, the foreign insurers found themselves not able to grow as fast as they have expected, which was described as their “Seven Year Itch” in China. Several cases of equity transactions have taken place in 2009-2010, mainly involved with the foreign insurers reducing their shareholdings. This was regarded as the sign of foreign insurers changing their strategies in Chinese market. In this paper we found strong evidence to show that the current performance of foreign insurers in China was relatively worse than that in the other major insurance markets. From the comparison of the regulatory environment and market performance, we can say for sure that regulation restrictions should be at least one of the major reasons for the current situation. Also we found that the “50-50” shareholding structure which was adopted initially by many life foreign insurers could be blamed for the slow growth recently. And poor bancassurance business performance could explain the shareholding reductions recently for some of the foreign life insurers.

基于保险监管视角，借鉴欧盟“偿付能力II”相关理论，对市场风险运用幂阶转换在险价值（Normal Power Approximation Value-at-Risk），并进行波动率时间序列建模；对保险风险运用精算模型；对信用风险和操作风险则借用巴塞尔新资本协议的相关标准模型，实证分析了我国财险公司的偿付能力资本需求。结果显示：偿付能力资本需求（Solvency capital requirement, SCR）是最低资本需求（Minimal capital requirement, MCR）的1.928倍，表明以风险为基础计算的资本需求远大于基于业务量大小的资本需求。

诉讼是一种高成本解决利益冲突的方式，一般是在双方关系僵持到破裂甚至公开对立时才使用。当银行对不能及时归还借款本息的企业提起诉讼时，一方面破坏了银企关系，作为一种惩罚也破坏了声誉的隐性契约作用，其“社会实施”机制导致企业原有的声誉资产丧失，造成了企业信贷融资规模的大幅下降，与同行业的其他企业相比也有显著差异。对不同所有权性质企业的检验结果表明，国有企业借款可得性受到的影响要比非国有企业小，政府的“援助之手”为国有企业提供隐形担保，信贷歧视现象依然存在。而与政府结交、建立政治关联，可以有效缓解非国有企业的信贷困难。

This paper investigates the dynamic and long-run relationships between monetary policy and asset prices in China using monthly data from June 2005 to September 2010. Johansen’s cointegration approach based on vector autoregression (VAR) and Granger causality test are used to identify the long-run relationships and directions of causality between asset prices and monetary variables. Empirical results show that monetary policies have little immediate effect on asset prices, suggesting that Chinese investors may be ‘irrational’ and ‘speculative’. Instead of running away from the market, investors rush to buy houses or shares whenever tightening monetary actions are taken. Such seemingly irrational and speculative behavior can be explained by various social and economic factors, including lack of investment channels, market imperfections, cultural traditions, urbanization and demographic changes. The results have two important policy implications. First, China’s central bank has not used and should not use interest rate alone to maintain macro-economic stability. Second, both monetary and non-monetary policies should be deployed when asset bubbles loom large to avoid devastating consequences when they burst.

针对实证研究揭示的并购中主并公司没有显著收益，甚至在连续并购中，主并公司绩效会越来越差的情况，本文提出了“主并公司为了避免可能存在的更大的损失而被迫进行无法获得显著收益的预防型并购”的动因。本文通过构建模型，从理论上说明，即使主并公司的股东和管理层之间不存在代理冲突，并且公司的决策理性时，主并公司依然可能进行无显著收益的并购。

Building on the important study by Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) and Ayyagari, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010), I examine whether third party guarantors play an effective role in assessing loan risk. Using a proprietary database of third party loan guarantees in China, I find strong evidence that guarantors and banks disagree on pricing loan risk, and that banks can better predict loan defaults than guarantors. I also find that the probability of loan default is affected by the capability of guarantor officers. My findings question the contribution of soft information in the improvement of credit scoring and support the view that informal finance should be limited. This paper also supports the implications of studies on human capital in financial intermediation.

在控制权转移中，大股东面临着重新选择持股比例和利益侵占的机会，出于自身利益最大化的考虑，大股东在不同持股比例下如何调整利益侵占行为，是我国资本市场投资者保护的重要课题。本文通过建立控制权转移中大股东的利益函数，得出以下推论：（1）控制权转移后，对于经营绩效低下的公司，大股东的持股比例与其利益侵占行为呈倒U型的关系；（2）控制权转移以后，对于经营绩效改善的公司，大股东的持股比例与其利益侵占行为呈倒N型的关系。最后，本文选取2001—2007年通过股权协议转让的方式发生控制权转移的上市公司作为检验样本，通过单变量分析和多元回归分析的方法进行了实证研究，分析结果较好地支持了上述推论。

基于国内普通股票型基金2004~2010年的样本，我们发现总体上基金的现金流与当期业绩成正比关系，同时与前期业绩成反比关系，在考虑内生性问题之后该结论依旧成立。进一步的分析发现，由于基金业绩在不同市场周期具有不同的持续性，投资者在基金收益的同时会考虑到期业绩持续性。牛市中基金业绩持续性较差，投资者倾向赎回前期业绩较好的基金；而在熊市，基金业绩持续性较强，投资者倾向赎回业绩垫底的基金；实际上，基金投资者能自己做出理性的选择。我们的结论支持基于当期基金业绩-现金流关系对基金管理者的激励机制，并对国内“基金赎回异象”作出了解释。

在中国股票市场上，基于公司规模分组的领先滞后关系的表现形式与国外有很大不同，本文认为这主要是因为政府过度干预影响了公司信息传播。政府干预可能从公司信息失真和政策市等两个方面严重阻滞公司信息传播，从而导致领先滞后关系的滞后期延长。其次，区别于多数文献的静态方法，本文发现必须引入动态的研究方法才能正确揭示领先滞后关系的全貌。此外，本文的研究还有力证明了实行价格涨跌幅限制有助于抑制过度投机、促进市场理性发展和提高市场效率。本文的结论对于如何界定政府干预的适度性和股票市场的信息监管具有重要含义。本文的结论从不同的角度进行稳健性检验都是非常显著的。

在中国股票市场上，基于公司规模分组的领先滞后关系的表现形式与国外有很大不同，本文认为这主要是因为政府过度干预影响了公司信息传播。政府干预可能从公司信息失真和政策市等两个方面严重阻滞公司信息传播，从而导致领先滞后关系的滞后期延长。其次，区别于多数文献的静态方法，本文发现必须引入动态的研究方法才能正确揭示领先滞后关系的全貌。此外，本文的研究还有力证明了实行价格涨跌幅限制有助于抑制过度投机、促进市场理性发展和提高市场效率。本文的结论对于如何界定政府干预的适度性和股票市场的信息监管具有重要含义。本文的结论从不同的角度进行稳健性检验都是非常显著的。