本文综合运用规模弹性、范围经济系数等指标，对我国14家代表性商业银行进行了实证分析，并以此来评价我国商业银行当前的发展状况。我们发现中国各种规模的银行都具有扩大规模和混业经营的空间。并且，小银行在规模经济方面更具有比较优势，大银行在范围经济方面更具有比较优势。这个结论与西方许多现存文献的观点不太一致。因此，我们提出，我国大小规模的银行都可以根据自己的经济实力进行混业经营，但小银行更应着重进行银行之间的合并或收购以扩大其规模。

Adrian和Franzoni(2009)给出了学习拓展的条件CAPM模型，本文利用状态空间模型对规模、账面市值比划分的25类投资组合进行了估计，卡尔曼滤波的结果表明，时变Beta的估计结果能比OLS估计更好的拟合股票价格的波动，Beta因子存在学习过程，在我国股市中，账面市值比因子更加显著的进入到学习过程中，规模因子作用效果并不显著。

为应对自1929 年大萧条以来最为严重的金融危机，美联储积极配合美国政府 的救援计划，采取一系列应对金融危机的非常规措施。随着近期全球经济出现企稳回升迹象， 国际社会对非常规政策何时退出问题的讨论日益增多。本文在回顾美联储主席伯南克在危机 前有关应对通货紧缩和金融危机的重要学术观点的基础上，对美联储非常规货币政策“退出” 的可能方式、时机、顺序等进行分析，并探讨“退出”政策的潜在影响及其启示。

由于掌握的数据、分析的视角以及承担职能的差异，政府各部门对通胀的看法与表态也不尽相同，其对社会公众通胀预期的引导作用必然存在差异。在通胀水平较高的时候，政府部门（含央行）在公众面前往往可发出两种声音：一是对未来前景的乐观表态（以下简称“乐观论调”），例如，发改委7月24日表示目前“不会造成太大的通胀压力”2以及商务部8月5日宣布“肉类价格两个月以来首次下跌”；二是对未来前景的更为审慎甚至悲观的判断（以下简称“悲观论调”），例如，我行在二季度货币政策执行报告中所说的“价格上行压力加大，通胀风险值得关注”及“通货膨胀风险趋于上升”等表述。我们可以从静态和动态的两个视角对此进行一些简要分析。

受国际金融危机的严重冲击，我外向型的经济结构带来重大挑战。在此背景下，如何正确看待内外需关系的变化，制订相应的经济政策，实现经济的可持续增长是摆在我们目前的重大课题。本文将从三大需求对GDP增长的贡献率和拉动作用的角度对此进行简要分析。

目前大家对全球经济失衡的讨论很多，但基本上都局限在静态的分析层面。本文试图从动态的视角对经常账户失衡的产生根源、福利后果以及调节机制进行经济学意义上的诠释。具体而言，我们首先从经常账户失衡的现状出发，借助开放经济下跨时均衡的动态分析框架，考察影响消费和投资行为的关键因素以及世界利率的决定，然后探讨了经常账户的跨时变化以及由生产率提高引起的国际利益分配问题。最后，本文还将模型的理论结果与当前的现实相联系，并提出了相应的政策建议。

Wurgler（JFE 2000）发现在资本配置越有效的金融市场中，公司层面的信息含量越丰富。然而，Morck 等（JFE 2000）发现在新兴资本市场中公司层面信息的含量很低。在40个样本国家中，中国股市面临的该问题的严重程度列居世界第二。本文以中国上市公司为样本，实证检验发现在控制了相关的公司特征和同时控制了公司固定效应及时间固定效应后，公司的盈余管理水平显著地与公司股价中公司层面信息的含量负相关。另外，我们还发现国有股权的出现也会降低公司层面信息的含量。此外，2007年实施的新会计准则明显降低了我国上市公司的盈余管理程度。本文中的发现说明盈余管理是解释在以中国为代表的新兴资本市场中，公司层面信息含量低的重要原因之一。因此，提高上市公司信息披露的准确性和透明度可以增强投资者保护，使资本在证券市场上得到有效的配置与利用，从而促进经济的长期发展。

This paper investigates whether Chinese equity investors price major earnings components correctly. Total earnings are decomposed into core and non-core earnings according to a classification framework of Chinese accounting principles. The results show that, as expected, core earnings are more persistent than non-core earnings. Most importantly, the market underestimates (overestimates) the value implications of changes in current core (non-core) earnings for future earnings changes. Therefore, future stock returns can be predicted based on the information that is contained in the components of current earnings. Both portfolio tests and regression analysis generate economically significant abnormal returns that are robust to sensitivity checks.

Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that required equity offering proposals and other major corporate decisions to seek the separate approval of minority shareholders, we empirically test the effect of a regulatory increase in minority shareholders’ control over corporate decisions on shareholder value. While the overall stock market reaction to the announcement of the regulation is insignificant, the stock market reaction is more positive for firms with higher institutional (especially mutual fund) block ownership and more negative for firms with higher individual block ownership. The regulation helps deter management from submitting value decreasing equity offering proposals, especially for firms with higher mutual fund block ownership. In addition, value reducing equity offering proposals submitted in the post-regulation period are more likely to be vetoed in firms with higher block ownership of institutional and individual minority shareholders. Overall, our results suggest that the 2004 regulation increases shareholder value, especially in firms with higher mutual fund block ownership.

This paper investigates the value effect of large investors through their impact on corporate investment policy using a sample of listed firms in the Chinese stock market where large shareholdings and concentrated ownership are a norm. We find that the impact of capital expenditures on firm value is closely related to the level of large shareholdings (non-tradable or state shareholdings). Capital expenditures are negatively associated with firm value if firms are controlled by entrenched large shareholders. Although there is a general tendency of over-investment, the negative impact of over-investment is cancelled out if firms are controlled by incentive-aligned large shareholders. We also find that, the incentive-alignment effect of large investors is stronger in scenarios where agency conflicts are more intensified. Our findings suggest that capital investment is an important channel through which the value effect of large investors is achieved.