本文以2005-2006年沪深两市发生重组并购事件公司的相关数据为样本，以其并购正式公告发布前的相关澄清公告的发布特征为切入，研究了公司治理结构特征与其澄清公告的发布及其真实性之间的关系，发现对最大股东的制衡、机构投资者、独立董事以及董事会规模等企业治理特征，对公司大股东的行为具有一定的约束作用；但当企业内幕信息泄露之后，面对公众质询，第一大股东是选择如实披露还是撒谎，这些治理结构特征却难以发挥作用，而基本决定于第一大股东对其行为后果的利益考量，其持股比例越高，则越倾向于如实披露公司信息。结果进一步提示：对公司大股东行为的研究，不应仅仅着眼于它的持股比例，更重要的还应着眼于对其相关约束机制的考察。

本文继承了前人关于并购时机的研究方法，将每个主并方的并购时机确定为：由主并企业与目标企业的进入、退出价值比阈值决定。在此基础上，主要研究了合作并购中，当主并方之间的单独并购的最优时机在时间维度上发生冲突时，如何找到合作条件下主并方的共同并购区域的问题。提出协同补偿作为时机冲突的解决途径，分别确定了先、后进入到各自最优并购区域的企业，在协同补偿存在时的影响阈值变动的内在因素。研究发现：协调补偿可降低进入、退出时的阈值，形成新的次优并购区域。当先进入者的退出阈值的变动速度低于后进入者进入阈值的变动速度时，则满足一定条件的协同补偿可协调主并方并购时机上的冲突。

资本项逆转在发展中经济体的金融危机中既是导火索又是预警器。本文运用面板probit模型对1970-2007年207个国家和地区的统计数据进行经验分析，发现国内经济特征（人均收入水平和产业结构）、相应制度安排（汇率制度、资本项管制）及宏观政策的配合是资本项逆转的主要决定因素；而且金融开放程度、汇率制度等宏观对策对资本项逆转风险的影响效果还受到国内经济特征的明显制约。因此，经历大规模资本流入的国家必须根据本国经济特征选择合适的汇率制度、资本项开放宽度和宏观政策，才能有效降低资本项逆转风险，从而保障整个经济的金融安全。

本文通过构建三部门内生增长模型，研究住房资本对经济结构和经济增长的作用机制。住房资本在物质资本中份额的上升会提高居民消费水平的增长速率。房地产投资对其他资本产生“挤出效应”，其他资本在收敛过程中加速形成提高了其他部门产出的增长率。住房资本还通过影响经济结构变量作用于各部门的产出。文章运用中国31个省区在1998－2007年的数据，对理论模型推导的结论进行实证检验。个体固定效应模型估计结果表明，住房资本对经济增长具有显著的正向作用。

本文通过修正的BGT模型，重新构造净国外资产变化（?NFA）与净国内资产变化（?NDA）变量，同时使用OLS和联立方程方法估计了中国自1994年汇改以来国际资本流动和货币政策之间的定量关系，并采用递归系数方法估计了其动态变化过程。结果显示：中国国际资本流动与货币政策冲突加重，货币政策虽对资本流动冲销力度充分大，但资本流动的抵消效应也十分大，央行货币政策独立性受到很大挑战，央行冲销工具面临无效性难题，正被迫寻找其他措施化解外汇占款。

2007至2008年的全球金融危机中，政府注资银行作为各国救助银行的重要手段成为学术焦点之一。本文延拓了Mitchell(2000)的注资银行模型，构造了政府注资银行的福利函数以决定最优注资额度，从而将政府注资额度内生化；同时，本文在银行寡头垄断模型的范式下将政府、银行和企业部门三者纳入博弈框架，揭示政府选择不同的注资银行政策对银行业所产生的影响，并提出了惩罚性的注资银行措施可以遏制银行存贷款市场的逆向选择问题等政策主张。

The independent directors of a board can impact CEO pay-performance more effectively if a compensation committee provides information and assist them in designing relevant executive pay schemes. On the basis of this idea, we developed and tested the hypotheses that Chinese firms with a compensation committee have a closer CEO pay link with performance when a larger proportion of independent directors serves on the board. We focused primarily on the effect of a compensation committee on CEO pay-performance relation as a consequence of its help for the board and found that board independence produces a stronger relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese listed firms. This association is more evident in those firms which have a compensation committee. Our findings suggest that the interaction between independent directors on the board and a compensation committee has important consequences for CEO incentive systems as well as corporate governance structures in China.

Using data from a large sample of the listed firms in China from 1999 to 2002, we find that firm profitability and state ownership are negatively related to top management turnover only when firm profitability is below target (measured by industry median). We also find that top management turnover has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when it occurs under performance below target, but has a negative impact when it occurs under performance above target. Lastly, we find that top management turnover under low performance has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when the state is not the largest shareholder, but has no impact when the state is the largest shareholder.

The separation of the government from the industry in telecommunications sector was carried out in a gradualist or experimental manner to make sure a “reform without losers”. Both the supervising ministries and local governments became the “early winners” who were in favor of the status quo. A meaningful industrial reform started from 1994 but ended in 1998. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was just right on time to secure the outcome of the reforms. However, determined by the nature of uncompetitiveness and state monopoly, the telecommunications sector was against the liberalization requested by the GATT/WTO members. Close administrative and financial connections between the supervising ministry and subordinate sector caused a high degree of convergence of their interest that in turn implies that the ministry had strong incentives of protecting the sector. After having terminated the fragmented governance since 1995, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) successfully prevented the sector from giving much concession compared to the other sectors during Sino- US negotiations. Although a limited concession was made, it is possible that the supervising ministries would not fulfil its commitment. On the one hand, the MII would refuse to cut off its administrative and financial ties with the enterprises. On the other hand, the enterprises would still be willing to be protected by the government for the monopolistic benefits. Even though the door is half-open to international competition, the Ministry had developed other means to block the entry of foreign service providers. A new form of fragmented governance is taking shape since 2003 when the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was founded. It created tensions between the bureaucracies and might create loopholes for the foreign entry in the future.

We investigate the following important questions in international business: How do MNEs choose ownership strategies when facing strong uncertainty in foreign market entries? How are the choices affected by industry contingencies? Following the key tenets of real options theory, we propose that, under a high level of market uncertainty, MNEs choose more flexible (rather than more committed) ownership strategies that allow adjustment of investment decisions in future. We further suggest that using flexible strategies in response to uncertainty becomes less valuable for MNEs when the industry they enter in the host country enjoys strong sales growth potential, requires less irreversible investments, and has intense competition. Empirically, we analyze the ownership strategies (ownership structure and equity share) of over 5,000 new foreign investments in manufacturing industries in China during 2000- 2006. We find qualified support for our hypotheses and discuss the industry boundary conditions of adopting flexible ownership strategies in foreign market entries.